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ABSTRACT 
China’s demographic transition will create great difficulty in continuing the scale of the 
economic development seen over the last thirty years.  This difficulty will be experienced 
through the costs of the demographic detour, which began during the Great Leap Forward 
and was then magnified through the birth limiting campaigns up to and including the 
One-Child Policy. While the skewing of the dependency ratio over the last thirty years 
resulted in significant contributions to China’s economic development, this has reached a 
limit where the unborn laborers will present a strain on development.  This strain will be 
present in the form of a shrinking and rapidly aging labor pool resulting in a decrease in 
innovation and productivity as well as an overhaul to thousands of years of tradition of 
doing business through familial ties.  This will all be culminated in the testing of an 
already failing pension system as China experiences the transition from the demographic 
stage of a slowly growing population to post-transition. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Has China’s demographic transition since 1949, with its aging population, 
reduced dependency ratios, and lower than replacement fertility rates, contributed to 
economic development within China?  Will this demographic legacy limit China’s future 
economic growth?   
B. IMPORTANCE 
Any possible limitation to China’s economic development should be evaluated 
thoroughly, and its demographic transition could negatively affect its future economic 
growth.  Currently there are two schools of thought regarding projections of China’s 
economic growth.  The first, and most dominant, projects its future on a trajectory 
determined by recent and past success, which presents little to no limits on future growth 
and development.  The second sees a limitation to China’s growth.  This limitation may 
come in the form of discontinued FDI, internal instability, or, as I will address in my 
thesis, the inability to cope with the coming demographic transition.   
While demographic transitions from pre-industrial countries, with high fertility 
and mortality rates, to modern industrialized nations, with low fertility and mortality 
rates, tend to follow similar models, China’s demographic path has been different.  Using 
Japan, South Korea, and India as models for what China will be experiencing can provide 
some insight but it is limited due to specific conditions only experienced by China. 
China’s demographic experiences include a far lower GDP per capita than Japan, an area 
and population that dwarfs South Korea, the One-Child Policy that India never 
experienced, and the Great Leap Forward, which is not comparable to any other nation’s 
experience.  
My thesis will thus approach the topic of the relationship between China’s 
demographic story and its economic development as a qualitative analysis spanning from 
1949 until 2000, broken into three temporal case studies and conclude with an analysis of 
the impacts China’s transition into the near future.  The case studies will be China during 
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the Great Leap Forward, China immediately after the One-Child Policy was instituted, 
and China in 2000. The timing of my thesis is appropriate because “demographic 
processes are highly inert in that they are conditioned by past population structures and 
by the relative continuity of demographic behavior.  To comprehend a current 
demographic situation, one must analyze the evolution of that population in the past.”1 
The implications of my research will enhance the starting positions for multiple 
future questions.  If China’s demographic transition is different from currently accepted 
models, what benefits has it reaped from governmental intervention to alter the country’s 
demographic profile?  What have the costs been or will they come later?  Is China’s 
model transferable and would it be advantageous to replicate it?  If China’s growth is 
limited due to its demographic transition, then, analysis of when, how, and the resulting 
regional and global dynamics is critical to allow for proper understanding of China’s 
economic trajectory and enable the United States to prepare for what the future may hold 
if there are indeed demographic limits to China’s economic growth. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
My hypothesis is that China’s demographic transition - consisting of its 
population’s age structure, labor percentages, dependency ratios and fertility rates – has 
positively affected its economic development so far, but some of the factors that 
contributed to China’s success will present long term costs in the next thirty to fifty years.  
The Great Leap Forward resulted in skewed dependency ratios, age ratios, and birth rates, 
enabling China to become more productive through a disproportionately large labor pool.  
Furthermore, China’s One-Child Policy continued the manipulation of the dependency 
and age ratios through restrictive birth rates, again resulting in a disproportionately large 
labor pool.  In addition, China’s cultural preference for male children compounded the 
effects of the One-Child Policy by reducing the number of women in each generation, 
resulting in even fewer children than there would have been otherwise.  When evaluated 
individually, each factor bears only a fraction of responsibility, but when taken all  
 
                                                 
1 Victor Perevedentsev, "The Demographic Situation in Post-Soviet Russia," in Population Under Duress: The 
Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia, ed. George J. Demko (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), 17. 
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together and compounded over a span of 60 years, I expect to find that China will 
experience a limitation on its labor pool, and hence its economic growth, within this 
century.   
Admittedly, there have been many contributing factors to China’s economic 
growth and success.  One problem I will have is not only determining if the demographic 
stages China has gone through have affected its economic development, but to what 
extent.  Likewise, if the demographic history of China has contributed to its success, will 
it also create a limitation to China’s economic growth in the future, and if so, when and to 
what degree might this limit exist?  Are there any policies or actions for China to help 
mitigate the effects of its changing demographics and has it undertaken any already?   
To address if a demographic limitation to Chinese economic growth exists I must 
first address if China’s past economic growth has been dependent on, or even greatly 
influenced by, the growing labor force and then analyze the factors that will contribute to 
the limits of that labor pool.  China’s demographic picture has affected its economic 
performance in many ways.  These factors include the median age of the Chinese 
population increasing due to medical advances, skewed dependency ratios, strict 
immigration restrictions, and a labor pool that is no longer expanding.   
China’s median age contributes to the aging of the population that may or may not 
correspond with the maturity of economic development.  A country with a median age of 
30 years old would have an advantage over a country with a median age of 70 years old if 
they were both competing to be a manufacturing giant, simply in terms of the available 
pool of working age labor.  Skewed dependency ratios enable increases in the size of the 
workforce as well as the ability to invest capital that otherwise would have gone to 
dependent care, supporting the youth or elderly.  A labor pool that is no longer expanding 
creates a limitation in human capital, forcing a transition away from industrial policies 
based on what had once appeared a limitless source of human capital.  Immigration 
restrictions are a tool to control the flow of human capital, potentially offsetting a rapidly 
aging population and adding to a labor pool that is no longer expanding.  
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on demographic transition theory is quite large and can provide a 
lot of information qualitatively as well as through quantitative, empirical and historical 
evidence.  Dudley Kirk describes demography as, “a science short on theory, but rich in 
quantification.”2 Jean-Claude Chesnais defines the demographic transition as “the 
process of modernization of the reproductive behavior in human populations.”3 Chesnais 
also goes on to explain that “the demographic transition can be made with reference to 
five phases: phase 1 (pretransition), phase 2 (declining mortality, high fertility: 
accelerating population increase), phase 3 (peak population growth), phase 4 (crude birth 
rate declining faster than the crude death rate: slowing population growth), phase 5 
(posttransition).”4  If there is any hope in affecting a country’s demographic transition, 
analysis should be done in a preemptive manner because, as explained by Nicholas 
Eberstat, “The overwhelming majority, roughly 80%, of the people who will inhabit 
China in 2030 are already alive, living there today.”5   
The relationship between the stages of demographic transition and economic 
growth are represented through “labor supply, savings behavior, and productivity 
changes.”6  One of the most profound impacts on economic performance by 
demographics is that the dependency ratio and life expectancy “have positive and large 
impacts on economic growth.”7  This is at least partially due to how dependency ratios 
and life expectancy “affect family decision making,” and “increase the incentive to invest 
in education.”8  
                                                 
2 Dudley Kirk, "Demographic Transition Theory," Population Studies (1996), 361. 
3 Jean-Claude Chesnais, "Demographic Transition Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure," Population 
and Development Review (1990), 327. 
4 Ibid., 327. 
5 Nicholas Eberstadt, "Demographic Trends Cloud China's Long-Term Economic Outlook," Japan Spotlight 
(2011), 26. 
6 Cliff Waldman, "China's Demographic Destiny and its Economic Implications," Business Economics (2005), 33.  
7 Ibid., 34. 
8 Ibid. 
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Within the stages of demographic transition, Andrew Mason has found there to be 
two demographic dividends that can greatly contribute to a country or region’s economic 
development.   
The first dividend arises because over the demographic transition countries 
experience an increase in the share of their populations concentrated in the working ages.  
On its face, this has a direct, favorable effect on per capita income.  Whether or not the 
first dividend is realized, however, will depend on how wages, labor force participation 
rates, and unemployment are affected by the rapid growth in the working age population 
that typically leads to the first dividend.9  
The second dividend arises as a response to the prospect of population aging.  A 
key economic challenge for aging populations is to provide for old-age consumption in 
the face of substantially reduced labor income.  Some societies are trying to meet this 
challenge by relying on transfer systems—either public programs or familial support 
systems.  Other societies are responding by increasing their saving rates and 
accumulating greater physical wealth or capital.  It is in this latter response that prospects 
for capital accumulation and more rapid economic growth are enhanced.10 
Wang Feng and Mason go on to explain that, “whether China will enjoy a second 
dividend remains to be seen,” because it will be dependent on the consumer, saving, and 
support environment created by policy within China.11  Victor Perevedentsev very 
astutely explained that, “demographic processes are highly inert in that they are 
conditioned by past population structures and by the relative continuity of demographic 
behavior.  To comprehend a current demographic situation, one must analyze the 
evolution of that population in the past.”12 
                                                 
9 Andrew Mason, Demographic Dividends: The Past, the Present, and the Future (Honolulu, HI: Population 
Studies Program, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Wang Feng and Andrew Mason, "The Demographic Factor in China's Transition," in China's Great Economic 
Transformation, eds. Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 154. 
12 Perevedentsev, The Demographic Situation in Post-Soviet Russia, 17. 
 6 
The first substantial event affecting China’s demographics in China’s recent 
history is the Great Leap Forward.  Debates over the events of the Great Leap Forward 
focus on the magnitude of destruction. Barry Naughton argues that throughout the Great 
Leap Forward, “about 25–30 million excess deaths occurred due to the great Chinese 
famine.  In addition, another roughly 30 million births were postponed due to 
malnutrition and shortage.”13   However, Frank Dikotter has estimates putting the 
excessive deaths associated with the Great Leap Forward “as high as 50 to 60 million 
people.”14  While Barry Naughton explains that after the Great Leap Forward, China was 
able to become a demographic early achiever, due to its socialized economy and public 
health system,15 there seems to be little to no mention of the Great Leap Forward’s 
skewed dependency ratio as a contributing factor to economic development, by Naughton 
or anyone else.  As seen in Figure 1, the structural change in labor changed significantly 
after 1978.  After reforms began in 1978, “the share of labor employed primarily in 
agriculture fell from 71 to 45 percent” by 2005, while the share of labor in the 
manufacturing and services sectors increased.16  This transition from agriculture to 
manufacturing and services is a hallmark of industrialization and development, signifying 
the process of transition within China.   
                                                 
13 Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2007), 72. 
14 Frank Dikotter, Mao's Great Famine, First ed. (New York: Walker Publishing Company, Inc., 2010), 333.  
15  Barry Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 165. 
16 Fang Cai, Albert Park and Yahohui Zhao, "The Chinese Labor Market in the Reform Era," in China's Great 




Figure 1.   Structural Change in Employment. (From 17) 
China’s One-Child Policy and the preceding birth-limiting campaigns also greatly 
affected China’s demography as “the average number of children expected to be borne by 
Chinese women were reduced from about six to slightly over two by 1980.”18  Also, the 
One-Child Policy created “an exceptional demographic window of opportunity for 
growth during the reform era.”19  One lasting effect of the One-Child Policy is that “more 
than 160 million Chinese families have only one child, a product in part of the country’s 
three-decade-old policy limiting couples to one child each,” which is greater than the 
total populations of Japan and Russia.20  Again, the resulting dependency ratios become a 
contributing factor to China’s economic development. 
Interesting sections of literature focus on China’s gender imbalance.  This 
literature focuses particularly on how the imbalance has come to existence and its 
potential security implications.  Mara Hvistendahl explains the current gender imbalance 
stems from a cultural preference for males, China’s One-Child Policy, and sex-
determination technology, all of which “resulted in 119 male births for every 100 female 
                                                 
17 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 151. 
18 Kenneth Lieberthal, The One Child Policy Turns 30 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2010). 
19 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 177. 
20 Wang Feng, "China’s Population Destiny," Current History (2010), 244. 
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births.”21  Valerie M. Hudson projects that, “China will have a surplus of between 29 and 
33 million males in the age group 15–34.”22  Hudson also goes on to argue the growth of 
men without chances to marry—known as ‘bare branches’ in China—a will create, “a 
significant increase in societal, and possibly intersocietal, violence.”23  Ultimately, 
Hudson says history displays governmental intervention to correct such gender 
imbalances through, “recruitment of bare branches into imperial armies, an approach that 
may lead to greater intersocietal violence in the effort to preserve domestic stability.”24  
As trends stand, by 2030 the “proportion of never-married men in their late 30s may be 
more than 25% nationwide.”25 
There is wide consensus that China’s early and rapid transition to the post-
transition stage, with a rapidly aging population, and low birth, mortality, population 
growth and consumption rates, will create a situation not yet experienced anywhere else.  
Barry Naughton put it quite eloquently when he wrote that, “China will grow old before it 
has had the opportunity to grow rich.”26 Cliff Waldman explains that all projected 
population growth into 2050 will come from lower and middle-income countries, with 
China as the only exception.27  David E. Bloom describes some reasons “population 
aging may have less dramatic negative effects on economic growth than some have 
predicted.”28  These reasons include healthier elderly, lower youth dependency, resulting 
in increased females in the workforce, potential for behavioral and policy changes to 
population aging, and increased migration from labor-surplus to labor-deficit countries.29   
 
                                                 
21 Mara Hvistendahl, "Why China's Gender Gap Persists," Current History (2010), 248. 
22 Valerie M. Hudson and Andrea M. den Boer, Bare Branches (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 186. 
23 Ibid., 200. 
24 Ibid., 227. 
25 Eberstadt, Demographic Trends Cloud China's Long-Term Economic Outlook, 26. 
26 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 176. 
27 Waldman, China's Demographic Destiny and its Economic Implications, 32. 
28 David E. Bloom, "Population Aging and Economic Growth," in Aging Asia, eds. Karen Eggleston and Shripad 
Tuljapurkar (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, 2010), 21. 
29 Ibid. 
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Susan Shirk described China’s situation by saying, “All today’s leaders need to do is 
avoid any international and domestic disruptions that could trip up their race against the 
demographic clock.”30  
The literature on China’s rise covers reasons for its rapid economic growth.  The 
different arguments are rooted in the economic reforms put forth by Deng Xiaoping as 
the basis of three decades of economic growth.31 One argument for China’s emergence as 
an economic juggernaut is that the Chinese Communist Party implemented what 
Chalmers Johnson called a “developmental state,”32  with its massive population ready to 
mobilize, and that Deng’s reforms acted as a catalyst.33  The developmental state is one 
that uses a developmental orientation through strong state intervention, and planning to 
achieve economic development, opposed to a regulatory orientation which refrains from 
strong state intervention and focuses on regulatory agencies and the development of free 
markets.34  A second view is that Deng’s reforms were the beginning of a successful 
period of economic experimentation within the Chinese economy.35  A third view is that 
of the convergence school, arguing that the reforms put forth by Deng Xiaoping began a 
transition into a market economy through “increasing liberalization, internationalization, 
and privatization of economic activities.”36  A fourth argues the specific policies were not 
as critical as the open door policy, which “symbolizes China’s sharp turn towards 
participation in the world market to speed up economic growth and technological 
modernization.”37  Whatever the case, many believe that “the process of market transition 
in China is far from complete.”38 
                                                 
30 Susan L. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 21. 
31 C. Fred Berstein et al., China's Rise (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), 
106. 
32 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 19. 
33 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 83. 
34 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 19. 
35 Wing Thye Woo, "The Real Reasons for China's Growth," The China Journal 41 (January, 1999), 116. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Carl Riskin, China's Political Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 316. 
38 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 85. 
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Aside from economics, assessments of China’s political future fall into three main 
camps.  Two of the camps focus primarily on international politics, and predict either that 
China’s rise will continue in a peaceful manner,39 or that it will split Northeast Asia and 
lead to increasing tensions and conflict in the region.40  The third camp, typically 
focusing on domestic conditions, is that China’s rise will stagnate or crumble.41  The 
domestic issues often focused on are domestic “destabilizing dissent”, China’s reliance 
on economic growth,42 and the coming demographic transition.43    
Literature on China’s economic future falls into one of three categories, which do 
not each have as much consensus at the previously mentioned three camps of China’s 
political future.  These categories are; literature on the future successes of China, pending 
issues for China to overcome, and what China must do to continue its prosperity.  A 
stakeholder and strong proponent of China’s future success are the Chinese authorities 
who “project another quadrupling of GDP by 2030.”44  Another proponent of China’s 
success, and Asia’s as a whole, is Peter A. Petri, who predicts, “By 2030, Asia’s GDP in 
PPP should be 55% larger than the combined GDP of the EU and the United States.”45  
He also says, “China would account for much of this gain as its share of world output 
rises from 13% in 2010 to 22% in 2030.”46  Less optimistic outlooks include Wang Feng 
who wrote that, “Japan’s economic stagnation, closely related to the aging of its 
population, serves as a ready reference.”47  I agree with Nicholas Eberstadt when he 
admits that, “China still has many potential sources for enhancing productivity in the 
                                                 
39 Peter A. Petri, "Asia and the World Economy in 2030: Growth, Integration, and Governance," in Strategic Asia 
2010–11, eds. Ashley Tellis, Andrew Marble and Travis Tanner (Washington D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian 
Research, 2010), 48. 
40 Kenneth Lieberthal, "China's Strategies and Goals Toward Northeast Asia," Asia Policy (2007), 68. 
41 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 21; Jaime Morgan, "China's Growing Pains: Towards the (Global) Political 
Economy of Domestic Social Instability," International Politics (2008), 415. 
42 Lieberthal, China's Strategies and Goals Toward Northeast Asia, 45. 
43 Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 20. 
44 Eberstadt, Demographic Trends Cloud China's Long–Term Economic Outlook, 26. 
45 Petri, Asia and the World Economy in 2030: Growth, Integration, and Governance, 60. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Feng, China’s Population Destiny, 246. 
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years immediately ahead,”48 but then goes on to question China’s future growth 
possibilities explaining that, “China’s conventionally defined manpower will peak by 
2016.”49  Eberstadt also addresses the disappearance of family connection to ask, “What 
will become of Chinese economic performance when this key element of the country’s 
growth formula is radically altered?”50  One hypothesis within the literature providing 
suggestions on what China must do to avoid economic downturn was presented by 
Michael Pettis who “argued that China’s GDP will grow at 3–4 percent, half of that 
predicted by other economists,” unless consumption drastically increases.51  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
My goal is to explore the past relationship of China’s demographic transitions and 
economic performance to better assess the presence of a limitation to China’s economic 
growth.  As already stated, my thesis will thus approach the topic of the relationship 
between China’s demographic story and its economic development as a qualitative 
analysis spanning from 1949 until 2000, broken into three temporal case studies.  These 
case studies will be China during the Great Leap Forward, China immediately after the 
One-Child Policy was instituted, and China in 2000.  I chose a format of chronological 
exposition and analysis for my thesis to present an accurate understanding of how past 
events and policies have contributed to recent economic successes but will eventually 
present future challenges for China.  To do this I will consult both literary and statistical 
sources.   
The writings include those put out by historians, economists and political 
scientists focusing on demographic transition theory,52 China’s past and present 
                                                 
48 Eberstadt, Demographic Trends Cloud China's Long–Term Economic Outlook, 29 
49 Ibid., 25. 
50 Ibid., 29. 
51 Michael Pettis and Douglas H. Paal, "Rebalancing and Growth: The Arithmetic of Chinese Adjustment," 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 22, 2011, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/22/rebalancing-and-growth-arithmetic-of-chinese-adjustment/548o. 
52 Chesnais, Demographic Transition Pattenrs and their Impact on the Age Structure, 327–365; Kirk, 
Demographic Transition Theory, 361–387; Perevedentsev, The Demographic Situation in Post-Soviet Russia, 17–40. 
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demographics,53 the Great Leap Forward,54 China’s One-Child Policy,55 and China’s 
economic development.56  My statistical sources will include; mortality, fertility, and 
population statistics from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs;57 UN 
Human Development reports and indices;58 data from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China’s;59 Gapminder World,60 and the CIA World Factbook.61 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The first chapter consists of an introduction, literature review, and thesis outline.  
The second chapter will be a description of demographic transition theory explaining; the 
five stages, the two economic dividends, and country examples.  The third chapter will be 
a case study of the Great Leap Forward and the demographic detour created through its 
massive death toll skewing China’s demography toward a more labor focused society 
bringing with it a baby-boom setting the stage for significant economic prosperity.   
                                                 
53 Bloom, Population Aging and Economic Growth, 21–34; Eberstadt, Demographic Trends Cloud China's Long-
Term Economic Outlook, 26–29; Feng, China’s Population Destiny, 244–251; Feng and Mason, The Demographic 
Factor in China's Transition, 136–166; Hudson and Boer, Bare Branches; Hvistendahl, Why China's Gender Gap 
Persists, 248; Waldman, China's Demographic Destiny and its Economic Implications, 32–45. 
54 Dikotter, Mao's Great Famine, 420. 
55 Feng, China’s Population Destiny, 244–251; Hudson and Boer, Bare Branches; Hvistendahl, Why China's 
Gender Gap Persists, 248; Lieberthal, The One Child Policy Turns 30, 1–45. 
56 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).; Bruce Dickerson, Who 
Consents to the 'Beijing Consensus'? Crony Communism in China (George Washington University: The Elliot School 
of International Affairs,2010).; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 
1990).; Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).; Johnson, MITI and 
the Japanese Miracle; Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," Foreign Affairs 73, no. 6 (November/December, 
1994), 62–78.; Morgan, China's Growing Pains: Towards the (Global) Political Economy of Domestic Social 
Instability, 413–438; Naughton, The Chinese Economy; Liqing Zhang and Zhixian Sun, "Effect of China's Rise on East 
Asian Economic Integration," Economic Change and Restructuring (2008), 315–330. 
57 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division," UN Population Division, January 12, 2012, http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/ 
panel_population.htm. 
58 U. N. Human Development, "United Nations Human Development Reports," United Nations, January 12, 
2012, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. 
59 National Bureau of Statistics of China, "National Bureau of Statistics of China," National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, April 2012, http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/. 
60 Hans Rosling, "Gapminder.Org," January 2012, http://gapminder.org. 
61 CIA, "CIA World Factbook," CIA, May 3, 2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html. 
 13 
The fourth chapter will be the case studies of China after the formal 
announcement of the One-Child Policy and China in the year 2000.  In this chapter, I will 
address the multiple birth-limiting campaigns, culminating into the One-Child Policy, and 
the resulting demography, which created an environment of increased investment into 
human capital.  This investment in human capital becomes quite apparent in my analysis 
of China in the year 2000.  The fifth chapter will be a chronological analysis of China’s 
demography and its contributions to economic development and growth.  My analysis 
will begin with the demographic detour started by the Great Leap Forward and magnified 
through the birth limiting campaigns and the One-Child Policy concluding that the 
skewing of the dependency ratio for over thirty years resulted in significant contributions 
to China’s economic development.  
The sixth chapter will be my conclusion, in which I present my finding that, the 
economic impacts of the demographic detour created by the Great Leap Forward and the 
One-Child Policy created economically favorable condition within China and that 
China’s demographic transition over the next thirty to fifty years will likely experience 
great difficulty in continuing the scale of the economic development seen over the last 
thirty.  This difficulty will be experienced through the costs of the demographic detour; 
and the unborn laborers attributed to the One-Child Policy.  This cost will be present in 
the form of a shrinking and rapidly aging labor pool resulting in a decrease in innovation 
and productivity as well as an overhaul to thousands of years of tradition of doing 
business through familial ties.  This will all be culminated in the testing of an already 
failing pension system as China experiences the transition from the demographic stage of 
a slowly growing population to post-transition. 
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II. DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS EXPLAINED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To understand the relationship between China’s demographics since the Great 
Leap Forward and its economic development I must first provide an explanation of 
demographic transition theory.  Demographic transition theory states that societies 
“experience modernization progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high 
mortality to a post-modern one in which both are low.”62  Demographic transition theory 
uses the demographic transition model to explain developments within a society, or 
country, through changes in its demography.  The demographic transition model consists 
of five different stages,63 based on a variety of demographic factors, and includes two 
potential economic dividends received throughout the transition.64  The first dividend 
occurs as the result of disproportional growth in a society’s working aged population, 
ages 15–64, and is received during the third and fourth stages of the demographic 
transition model.  The second dividend is the result of increased consumption by an 
increasing elderly population, funded by the wealth they obtained throughout the 
previous stages. 
This chapter is broken into four sections; the introduction, definition, the stages, 
and the conclusion.  The introduction will provide a brief overview of the chapter as well 
as a roadmap of the current chapter.  Next, the section on definitions will briefly describe 
the transition model along with explaining different demographic factors used throughout 
this thesis.  The stages section explains each of the five stages of the demographic 
transition model in depth while giving an example of each.  Finally, the conclusion will 
provide a summary of the chapter. 
                                                 
62 Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory, 361. 
63 Early theorists only considered the first four stages, but since the introduction of the fifth, there has 
been no challenge to its incorporation to the theory. 
64 Chesnais, Demographic Transition Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure, 327; Feng and Mason, The 
Demographic Factor in China's Transition, 146. 
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B. DEFINITIONS 
The demographic transition model is a five-stage model that describes the 
evolution of countries from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates,65 and 
can correlate to a country’s maturation from a pre-modern to a modern economic 
system.66  The primary demographics used in demographic transition theory are crude 
birth rate, population growth rate, crude death rate, population median age, dependency 
ratios, gender ratios, life expectancy, and total fertility rates.67  Definitions used in this 
thesis come from a compilation of sources.68 
Crude birth rate is the calculation of live births per thousand people in a 
population69 and will be used interchangeably with birth rate throughout this paper.  
Population growth rate is the rate at which the overall population increased in a given 
year; this is to account for births, deaths, and immigration.  Crude death rate is the 
calculation of deaths per thousand people in a population, without any regard for age or 
reason and will be used interchangeably with death and mortality rate throughout this 
paper.  The population’s median age is the age at which half of the population is older 
and half the population is younger; this is calculated not by averaging out the 
population’s ages but by determining the density of age groups.  
Dependency ratios are determined by dividing a country’s eligible workforce by 
the number of dependents within the country.  The eligible workforce is defined as 
persons between the ages of 15 and 64, dependents are the persons 14 years and younger 
plus persons 65 years and older.  Gender ratios represent the ratio of males to females in a 
general or specified population.  Life expectancy indicates the number of years a  
 
                                                 
65 Chesnais, Demographic Transition Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure, 327.  
66 Oden Galor, "The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth," (2005, Journal 
of the European Economic Association), 495.; Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory, 361.  
67 Feng and Mason, The Demographic Factor in China's Transition, 136. 
68 Feng and Mason, The Demographic Factor in China's Transition.; Chesnais, Demographic Transition Patterns 
and their Impact on the Age Structure.; Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory.; Galor, The Demographic Transition 
and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth.  
69 Not to be mistaken with births per woman in a given year. 
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newborn infant is expected to live “if patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to 
stay the same throughout its life.”70  Total fertility rates are the number of children born 
per woman throughout her lifetime.   
C. STAGES 
So far, of the five identified stages within the demographic transition model only 
the first four have been experienced by multiple countries.  As illustrated in Figure 2, the 
five stages are: pre-transition (high birth rate and high mortality rate), accelerating 
population (declining mortality rate and high birth rate), peak population growth (birth 
rate declining slower than mortality rate), slowing population growth (birth rate declining 
faster, but still higher than, mortality rate), and post-transition (birth rate below 
mortality).71  Only Japan has experienced the post-transition stage.  I will describe the 
first stage’s condition and its economic impacts, but due to limited data can only describe 
when different countries experienced that stage of transition.  I will describe and explain 
the 2nd–5th stages through preliminary conditions, necessary conditions, economic 
impacts, and an example of a country that experienced that stage.   
 
Figure 2.   The Demographic Transition Model. (From 72) 
                                                 
70 World Bank, "Gross Domestic Product 2010," January 12, 2012, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. 
71 Chesnais, Demographic Transition Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure, 327. 
72 Ibid., 328. 
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1. Stage 1 – Pre-transition 
The first stage of the demographic transition model is pre-transition.  Any country 
prior to the 17th century provides an example of a country in the pre-transition stage.  
The necessary condition to be a pre-transition country is a high mortality rate, 30–50 per 
thousand, coupled with a high birth rate, also 30–50 per thousand.73  High, and often 
volatile, mortality and birth rates cause consistent and steady population growth to be 
very difficult for a country in pre-transition.  Deficiencies in medical knowledge, lack of 
vaccines and proper hygiene, plagues, and occasional food shortages kept the mortality 
rate high, while a necessity for replacement workers, low prospects of children to reach 
adulthood, and a desire to grow one’s community maintained a high birth rate.   
In a natural case, these high birth and high mortality rates indicate a low life 
expectancy, and large turnover of people.  A low life expectancy is ordinary because if a 
country had these high rates paired with a high life expectancy, it would result in the 
healthiest and youngest of the population dying thus keeping the mortality rate high, 
affecting the birth rates, causing the civilization to dwindle.  It is because of this low life 
expectancy and large turnover of population that a pre-transition country has little 
incentive to invest in human capital, or to foster education beyond necessary on the job 
training.  Pre-transition countries are typically pre-industrial because industrialization 
requires excess labor, which means it will already have begun the transition to the second 
stage.  I will use the economic situation of pre-transition as a baseline to measure the 
departures made when a country begins transition to and through the other stages.  
Due to limited records, data from a pre-developed country is difficult to find and 
rather unreliable.  At least since the 1960s, no country remains in the pre-transition stage.  
Because of advances in medicine and the outreach of aid through medical programs, 
mortality rates have consistently decreased, with the exception of combat zones.  The  
 
 
                                                 
73 Keith Montgomery, "The Demographic Transition," March 18, 2008, 
http://www.uwmc.uwc.edu/geography/demotrans/demtran.htm. 
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best historic example is seventeenth century England, pre-industrial revolution.  As 
depicted in Figure 3, the population of England was slowly growing, less than 1 percent 
per year, the century prior to the Industrial Revolution.   
 
Figure 3.   English Population Totals 1541–1871. (From 74) 
2. Stage 2 – Accelerated Population Increase 
The second stage of the demographic transition model is accelerated population 
increase.  Precursors of this stage include the same conditions as in the pre-transition 
stage: high mortality and high birth rates.  The necessary condition for the transition to 
the second stage is a development causing a steady decrease in the mortality rate.  This 
decrease in the crude death rate may occur through permanent improvements to the food 
supply, better sanitization, vaccines, or public health programs.75  The increase in 
population growth is attributed to a declining crude death rate, while retaining high crude 
birth rates from pre-transition; the same inputs with fewer outputs.   
The economic impact of the second stage of the demographic transition model is 
growth and development of the working aged population.  Causation is rooted in an 
increase in quality of life, often through a medical development resulting in improved 
hygiene or better treatment of the laborers.  The result of this increased quality of life is a 
more productive population through the synergetic increase in healthy years of 
productivity and the more experienced workers they become.  This more productive and 
                                                 
74 Edward Anthony Wrigley, Roger Schofield and Schofield R.S., The Population History of England 1541–1871 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univerysity Press, 1989), 207. 
75 Montgomery, The Demographic Transition. 
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enduring population will see benefit in investments in human capital through education, 
training, and the ability to specialize.  Therefore, as a country goes through stage 2, it 
continues to have a high inflow of workers who will work for a longer time, gaining 
greater experience, thus creating a surplus of labor.  In addition, with a surplus of 
workers, people gain more free time to explore doing other things; such as education for 
themselves and the youth, better business practices, and innovation.  This leads to more 
efficient uses of labor, creating a synergy of increased human capital, lifespans and 
development,76 which then leads us to stage 3. 
India in 1953 is an example of a country in the second stage of the demographic 
transition model: accelerated population increase.  Figures 4, 5, and 6 graphically depict 
India’s experience through the second stage of the demographic transition model.  Figure 
4 shows the great increases in longevity, while Figure 5 illustrates the continued increase 
in dependents, which together resulted in accelerated population growth, as seen in 
Figure 6.  As of 1953, India had a death rate of 26, and a high birth rate of 43, resulting in 
an annual population growth rate of 2 percent.77  In addition, life expectancy was 38 
years old and rising (Figure 4); and its dependency ratio was 71, to peak 12 years later at 
81 (Figure 5).78  India’s transition started in the early 1900s, (Figure 6) and by 1953 was 
growing at an accelerated rate.  In India’s case, it can be associated with Mahatma 
Gandhi’s return to India in 1915 and participation in the Indian National Congress.  
Gandhi led nationwide campaigns on easing poverty, increasing economic self-reliance, 
and the independence of India from foreign domination.79  It was with the assistance, or 
acknowledging the need, of these nationwide programs that the second stage of 
demographic transition began.  In India’s case, it was the impact of Gandhi’s nationwide 
campaigns that allowed India’s quality of life and longevity to improve.   With this 
improvement in longevity, India moved into the second stage of the demographic 
transition model.   
                                                 
76 Galor, The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth, 501. 
77 Rosling, Gapminder.Org. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Percival Spear, "Mahatma Gandhi," Modern Asian Studies (1969), 297. 
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Figure 4.   India's Life Expectancy, 1880–1980. (From 80) 
 
Figure 5.   India's Dependency Ratio, 1950–2010. (From 81) 
 
Figure 6.   India's population, 1700–2000. (From 82) 
3. Stage 3 – Peak Population Growth 
The third stage of the demographic transition model is peak population growth.  
The necessary condition for this stage is for a country’s birth rate to begin decreasing but 
                                                 




not yet at a rate higher than the death rate.   The birth rate will still be greater than the 
death rate, but the time for accelerated growth is over.  Preliminary conditions for the 
birth rate to go down are met when fertility is within the calculus of choice, reduced 
fertility is seen as advantageous, and effective techniques of fertility reduction are 
available.83  The main economic impact is the introduction of the first dividend, due to 
decreased birth rate.  The third stage is often the shortest in duration due to the slowed 
rate of change in the death rate after having already plummeted through the second stage.   
The preliminary conditions are met by the realization and further progress of the 
developments that decreased the mortality rate through the second stage.  Medical 
developments, a shift from an agrarian lifestyle, and technological developments begin 
replacing the need for a large surplus of labor.  Medical developments that contribute to 
the transition from the second to the third stage of the demographic transition model all 
focus on the youth.  From better birthing practices to childhood vaccines, as countries 
develop, their infant mortality rates go down.  As the infant mortality rates decrease and 
more children maintain better health, parents no longer need to have multiple children 
hoping for one to achieve adulthood.  They can have two or three with the expectation for 
them to succeed on the journey into adulthood.  The time delay between decreased crude 
death rates and birth rates is generational due in part to the confirmation that people will 
survive longer before the decrease in births begin.84   
In addition, a shift from an agrarian lifestyle can also contribute to a decrease in 
the crude birth rate.  As a society becomes increasingly urbanized, or at least strays away 
from agricultural productivity, and the necessity of children of large families working, 
they can now become investments in the future.  This creates an environment that 
displays benefits to having fewer children to foster and concentrate resources.85  In 
addition, there are technological developments that lessen the need for a large surplus of  
 
 
                                                 
83 Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory, 365. 
84 Chesnais, Demographic Transition Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure, 329. 
85 Galor, The Demographic Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth, 500.  
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labor; as illustrated in the area of agricultural labor.  If development makes available 
technology such as tractors and thrashers, the demand for human labor comes down 
drastically.  This can also be seen in the usage of assembly lines and robots. 
Governmental influence can assist in the previous stages, as described in India, 
but as countries develop governments are able to take larger roles and have better reach 
into populations.  Governmental policies can influence, or shock in the case of China, the 
transition from the high crude birth rate of the second stage to the decreasing crude birth 
rate of the third stage.  These policies can include subsidies or tax incentives for family 
planning, contraceptive education programs, or government-sponsored medical 
intervention.  In the case of China, I will argue later in this thesis, the policies of both the 
Great Leap Forward and the One-Child Policy were not typical scenarios of 
governmental influence affecting the population but policies that created immense shocks 
not witnessed elsewhere in the world, before or since.   
The greatest economic impact of the third stage is putting a country in position to 
begin the first dividend, reaping the rewards to the second stage’s continued increase in a 
productive labor force with a decreasing dependency ratio as the birth rate lowers.  “The 
first dividend measures increases in income per capita that occur because the productive 
population is growing at a faster rate than the total population over part of the 
demographic transition.”86  The dependency ratio can illustrate the extent of which the 
productive population is growing compared to the rest of the population.   
An example of stage 3 of the demographic transition model is India in 1973.  The 
preconditions of India having been in stage 2 have already been discussed and met.  In 
1973, India’s crude death was rate was 15, down from 26 in 1953, and a birth rate of 37, 
down from 43 in 1953.  These rates resulted in the necessary high and peaked annual 
population growth rate of 2.3 percent, up from 2 percent in 1953, for the duration of stage 
3, which lasted from 1962–1979.  In addition, life expectancy was 51 years, an increase 
of 13 years since 1953, and its dependency ratio was 77 percent, decreasing from its peak 
of 81 percent in 1965.  The overall GDP growth during this 17-year period was 75 
                                                 
86 Feng and Mason, The Demographic Factor in China's Transition, 146. 
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percent, or 3.8 percent per year.  However, if you look at the GDP per capita growth in 
India from 1963–1979, it was only 14.5 percent, or 0.9 percent per year.  These growth 
rates are misleading unless contextualized next to the 46 percent growth in population 
over the same 17 years, or 2.3 percent annual.87  
4. Stage 4 - Slowing Population Growth 
The fourth stage of the demographic transition model is slowing population 
growth.  The preliminary conditions for this stage, like the last, are medical 
developments, the shift to an industrializing economy, technological developments 
replacing the need for a large surplus of labor, and/or governmental policies, merely over 
a longer period.  The necessary condition for this stage is a crude birth rate decreasing at 
a higher rate than the crude death rate.  Throughout the fourth stage, the population will 
continue to grow, but at a slower and consistently decreasing rate than the previous stage.  
The greatest economic impact of this stage is the full realization of the first dividend, as 
well as being an economic indicator to prepare for the second dividend. 
While the differences in demographic factors between the third and fourth stage 
may not appear significantly different, the transition represents a tipping point.  The 
tipping point is the shift from a country growing due to high birth rates and increasing 
longevity, stage 3, to a country growing based primarily on increased longevity.  It is in 
this stage that a country’s median age begins to rise at an increasingly rapid rate, but still 
being maintained well within the productive ages of 15–64.   
As mentioned, a country begins to experience the first dividend at the end of the 
third stage.  However, the fourth stage will bring full realization of the first dividend in 
both duration and magnitude.  Throughout the fourth stage a country will experience a 
more rapid decline in dependency ratio, and an even healthier labor force than stage 3.  
The lowering dependency ratio will allow parents and educational institutions to have 
more focus of resources, and allow females, who were traditionally raising children, to 
become potential laborers at younger ages.  The magnitude of the first dividend will 
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depend on the length of time a country took to transition through the second and third 
stages.  For example, if the transitions occurred quickly the extension of life to the elderly 
will not affect the dependency ratio until much later, increasing the magnitude of the first 
dividend.  The reverse is also true; if the transition takes multiple generations to achieve 
stage 4, the first dividend will not be as great due to the dependency of elderly. 
Besides the first dividend, the fourth stage can act as an economic indicator.  The 
fourth stage indicates that the wave of population is calming and a review of 
governmental policies may be needed to continue the path of economic growth in lieu of 
dependence on perpetual labor inputs.  The policies reviewed should include: planning 
for pensions, rate of transition into a higher levels of industry, immigration, and ensuring 
the development of a wealthy elderly population.   
Plans for pensions should be reviewed in light of the once again growing 
dependency ratio, although this time it will be skewed toward an abundance of elderly.  
The rate of transition into a higher level of industry is necessary to see that the workforce 
available in stage five will be able to sustain the environment created with the shrinking 
labor force and skewed dependency ratio.  Immigration policy evaluations can be used as 
a possible gap fix in the event a negative population trend is expected.  Ensuring a 
wealthy and consuming elderly population is possibly the best method to ensure an 
effective use of the second dividend and a steady transition into the fifth stage.  A 
wealthy elderly population would be able to support a modern economic system through 
domestic consumption and transfers of wealth.   It is because of this forewarning, along 
with the benefits of the first dividend, that the setup, or investment, for the second 
dividend can begin.   
To achieve the second dividend a country requires a wealthy elderly population to 
increase consumption in order to continue economic growth, or at least maintain the 
economic system already in place.  The theory of the second dividend is that it arises 
“because changes in age structure influence the processes that lead to the creation of 
wealth.”88  The aging of the population throughout the previous stages should lead to an 
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accumulation of capital.  This accumulation of wealth will then lead to a country’s capital 
intensity, and “output per worker will rise.”89  Throughout the fourth stage, fewer 
children will allow dual working families and increases to savings and productivity.  As 
capital intensity, output per worker, the size of the labor pool, savings, and productivity 
all increase through the fourth stage, individuals leaving the workforce will have 
accumulated significant wealth throughout their lifetimes, enabling the second dividend 
in stage 5.   
An example of stage 4 of the demographic transition model is current day India.  
The preconditions of India having been in stage 3 have already been discussed and met.  
In 2008, India’s crude death rate was seven, down from 15 in 1973, and a birth rate of 23, 
down from 26 in 1973, resulting in an annual population growth rate of 1.3 percent, again 
down from 2.3 percent in 1973.  In addition, life expectancy was 65 years, an increase of 
14 years since 1973.90  India’s dependency ratio in 2008 was 55 percent, lower than the 
77 percent in 1973, and much lower than its peak of 81 percent in 1965.91  India’s overall 
GDP growth in the 28-years span from 1980 to 2008 was 495 percent, or 5.6 percent per 
year, up from 3.8 percent per year throughout stage 3.92  In addition, GDP per capita rose 
4 percent annually, compared to 0.9 percent per year in stage 3.  These rates illustrate the 
economic development throughout stage 4 especially when contextualized next to the 1.8 
percent annual growth in population, compared to 2.3 percent in stage 3.93  In short, stage 
4 brought more economic development with less population growth, equating to greater 
growth in GDP per capita. 
5. Stage 5 – Post-transition 
The fifth stage, post-transition, is mostly theoretical in the sense that only one 
country, Japan, has actually achieved the necessary conditions.  The preconditions are 
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those set forth by stage four with a diminishing birth rate.  The necessary condition to 
achieve stage five is the reduction of birth rate equal to or below the crude death rate, 
thus creating a sustained or negative trend in population growth.  The economic impacts 
of being in the post-transition stage appear linked to the country’s ability to prepare for 
the second dividend during the prosperous times through stage 4. 
The key to economic progress through the fifth stage is increased productivity 
from the laborers you do have, while ensuring an elderly population that can foster 
consumption due to already accumulated wealth.  After achieving the fifth stage, a 
country must be able to endure the transition of the labor force from having more inputs 
(laborers) than outputs (retirees), to more outputs than inputs.  If a country is able to 
ensure the development of a wealthy elderly population, through the suggested review of 
policies in stage 4, the second dividend will enable economic growth, or at least stability, 
to the current economic system.  
As mentioned, Japan is the only exemplar for the fifth stage of the demographic 
transition cycle.  Since 2004, Japan has had either zero or negative growth.94  In 2011, 
Japan had a crude death was rate was 10.09, and a crude birth rate of 7.31, with an annual 
population growth rate of -0.278 percent.95  In addition, life expectancy was 82.25 years, 
and its dependency ratio was 56 percent, rising from a low of 43 percent in 1994.96  
Japan’s sustainability for the demographic transition appears to be the movement into a 
high level of industry and the creation of a wealthy and consuming elderly.  As seen in 
Figure 7, not only was the labor income able to continue to rise for those in the working 
ages, 15 to 64 years old, but the consumption habits of the elderly, 65 years and older, 
grew by over 50 percent from 1984 to 2004.  Japan’s GDP per capita for 2010 was 
$62,100 (USD), the fifth highest in the world.97  Increased consumption and industrial 
development allowed Japan to sustain the transition to stage 5, post-transition, and 
illustrates the need for planning to enhance the economic effects of the second dividend.   
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Figure 7.   Age-specific Profiles of Per Capita Consumption and Production in 
Japan, 1984–2004. (From 98) 
D. CONCLUSION 
While demographic transition theory does not explain everything, I argue that it is 
definitely a significant piece in terms of economic development in terms of the stages 
depicted in the demographic transition model.  The path appears natural and flowing as 
seen through the experience of many different countries described through birth rates, 
population growth rates, crude death rates, population median age, dependency ratios, 
gender ratios, life expectancy, and total fertility rates.   The five-stage model describes 
the evolution of countries from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates, as 
a country matures from a pre-industrial to a modern economic system.  Along the path, 
there are two dividends, each growing out of the results of previous stages.  The first 
dividend is formed by the disproportional growth between the labor pool and dependents.  
The second is rooted in the wealth accumulated by the elderly. 
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III. CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHY AND 
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES, 1949–1970 
A. INTRODUCTION 
To argue the case for China’s demographic transition and its influence on 
economic performance, I will briefly go as far back as Qing dynasty.  This chapter will 
present China’s demographic and economic situation prior to and immediately following 
the Great Leap Forward.  In this thesis, 1965 China will be my first case study and the 
base year, before the full effects of the Great Leap Forward took effect.  In this chapter I 
address the period of 1949 to 1970 to establish the situations prior to, during and caused 
by the Great Leap Forward.  While the demographic situation for economic growth is 
rooted in 1970, the economic benefits of the Great Leap Forward cannot be fully 
analyzed until 1980, which is addressed in the next chapter.   This will later be compared 
with China’s demographic and economic situation after instituting the One-Child Policy, 
and then again with 2000 China.       
China’s demographic transition followed a similar to any other country as it went 
from a pre-transition state (stage 1) to experiencing accelerated growth (stage 2), until it 
experienced a great shock from the Great Leap Forward in 1958, causing a demographic 
detour.  Through massive mobilization of the Chinese populace and the death of millions 
of dependents, the Great Leap Forward created a governmentally caused demographic 
shock, speeding the country’s transition through the second and third stages of the 
demographic transition model.  This detour consisted of a drop in the median age in 
China from 23.8 in 1950, to 19.7 in 1970, an unnatural drop in the elderly dependency 
ratio from 7.4 elderly to every 100 potential laborers in 1950, to 6.6 in 1965, and a 6.1 
percent lower number of infants aged 0–4 in 1960 than 1955.99  In addition, China was 
set up to begin receiving economic benefits from the first demographic dividend and 
prematurely achieve stage 4 of the demographic transition cycle.  This detour created a  
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unique path of demographic development within China which was later exacerbated by 
the One-Child Policy contributing to the over thirty years of unprecedented economic 
growth within China.   
In this chapter, I will first discuss how China’s demographic transition followed a 
natural course prior to the Great Leap Forward.  Next, I will discuss different facets of the 
Great Leap Forward and how they contributed to the demographic and economic 
situation following the Great Leap Forward.  These facets include, labor growth, labor 
un-productivity, and ultimately the demographic detour caused by the Great Leap 
Forward.    
B. THE NATURAL DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION OF CHINA 
Prior to the Great Leap Forward, 1958–1962, China had long been on a natural 
path through the demographic transition cycle.  The path began with pre-transition (stage 
1) during the Ming and Qing dynasties.  Transition to the stage of accelerated population 
growth (stage 2) began after the fall of the Qing, and continued as the Nationalists rose to 
power.  The population even experienced a significant growth spurt immediately after the 
Communists took power. 
The pre-transition stage is evident through a rural population of over 90 percent, 
with many farmers who produced barley enough to feed themselves, and the low 
population growth rates of 0.4 percent existent for nearly six hundred years under the 
Ming and Qing dynasties.100  The primary limitation on growth was a nearly one-to-one 
ratio of needed laborers to mouths to feed, often associated with “the limited role of 
animals in farm work,”101 and little change in agriculture or technology, “during the six 
centuries beginning with the Ming”. 102 
Transition into the second stage of the demographic transition model, accelerating 
population, occurred around 1914, shortly after the fall of the Qing Empire.  This is 
evident in a gradual increase in population growth, a gradual transition away from the 
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agricultural sector as a percent of GDP, and investments into modernization and human 
capital.  Population growth in the period from 1911–1949 steadily climbed with an 
average of 0.6 percent per year.103  Agriculture as a share of GDP decreased from 61.8 
percent in 1914 to 59.2 percent by 1933 with industry rising by 2.2 percent to 19.8 
percent, over the same period.104  Throughout this time, literacy began to increase and 
upon the unification of China in 1927, the Nationalists began to “invest in such things as 
education and agricultural extension services.”105  
While the Chinese civil war from 1937–1949 “brought mass suffering to the 
population and serious damage to the economy,”106 the demographic transition did not 
end upon the Communist takeover.  From 1953 to 1958, China’s death rate had fallen 
from 25 to 21 per thousand, and its birth rate had already begun dropping, from 44 to 36 
per thousand.  Life expectancy continued to grow from 41 in 1949, to 50 in 1958.  During 
the years from 1949–1957, China’s population growth averaged 1.8 percent, up from 0.6 
percent of the previous 38 years.107  China was transitioning in a natural progression, 
until the shock of the Great Leap Forward.   
C. THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 
The Great Leap Forward is an example of how governmental policies can affect 
the demographic cycle.  The Great Leap Forward was to be “a radically new approach to 
economic and social development.”108  However, “it amounted to a tremendous, willful 
leap away from reality, with tragic consequences that included, ultimately, the death of 
tens of millions of Chinese.”109  The goal of this radically new approach was massive 
industrial acceleration using mass mobilization of the populace.  This goal is identical to 
the first demographic dividend: increased economic growth due to disproportionately 
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more laborers than dependents, and is typically experienced at the end of the third and 
throughout the fourth stages of the demographic transition cycle.  Mobilization of the 
masses was undertaken through development of communes, to include communal 
nurseries and retirement homes.  While efforts to mobilize the masses were effective, the 
levels of production suffered and the potential dividends provided by the communes were 
wasted.   
The Great Leap Forward was a push to achieve “more, faster, better, and more 
economical results,” corresponding to Mao’s declaration in November of 1957 that China 
“may well catch up with or overtake Britain,” in steel production.110  Despite resistance 
against his plans for the Great Leap Forward from advisors, such as Bo Yibo, one of 
Mao’s chief economic planners, Mao went forward anyway.  Mao demanded full 
allegiance to his plan of simultaneously developing agriculture and industry, both heavy 
and light.111  
1. Labor Growth 
Aware of China’s greatest asset, a potential labor force of hundreds of millions, 
Mao believed that full mobilization would be able to catapult China beyond the rest of 
the world.112  Mao’s vision for this workforce would be achieved through communes to 
share the burden and fulfill each need.  Communes “served both as basic-level 
government organs and the key economic units,” and assigned peasants “to specialized 
work teams that traveled from one village to another to perform particular tasks.”113  
Through the communes, kindergartens nurseries for the children would enable a greater 
workforce, enabling women to contribute.114  In addition, retirement homes would be 
able to care for the elderly in order to lessen any burden from able-bodied workers.115  
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This skewing of the dependency responsibilities, though not reflected in any calculations 
of a dependency ratio, should have been able to create a larger, and thus more productive, 
workforce, realizing the first dividend much earlier than the typical fourth stage of the 
demographic transition.   
However, the reality was much different.  The supervisors of the nurseries lacked 
training and often abused the resources intended for the children.  Illness was rampant 
with documented infection rates of up to 90 percent in some areas and death rates were 
high. 116  Retirement homes were not any better than the nurseries.  “Abuse was rife.  
Some of the elderly were beaten, even those with only a few meager possessions were 
robbed and others were put on a slow starvation diet.”117   
2. Labor Un-Productivity 
The enabling of the workforce may have contributed to productivity but the 
projects undertaken were often ill conceived, counter-productive, total facades, or all of 
the above.  Three examples of such projects were grain output and distribution, the 
backyard furnaces, and irrigation of the Tao River.  Not one of them achieved what they 
were set out to, illustrating the perpetual cycles of absurd distribution and dissociation 
from reality that led to famine and millions of deaths throughout the Great Leap Forward. 
Grain output and distribution began as exaggerated estimations to gain political 
clout but ended as a horrendous tragedy.  While Mao was pushing for “more, faster, 
better, and more economical results,” the party officials found favor through high crop 
yield, which spurred them into competitive bidding built upon unreasonable expectations.  
From these unreasonable expectations, local officials maintained a facade of success by 
providing the bid’s portion in taxes, leaving the deficit to be suffered by the rural 
populace.  The incredible productivity seen by Mao, although inflated at every level of 
government before him, led him to suggest that a third of the cultivated land be diverted  
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for other purpose.118  This command created a downward spiral of increased migration 
from the harsh life in the agricultural sector to the subsidized urban life-style, increasing 
the government’s demand for food with less labor to work the fields.119   
Focused on the goal of overtaking Britain in steel, Mao demanded a way to bring 
big industry to the village.  From this demand came a movement to support industrial 
development and bring China into the forefront of the industrial world.  In the summer of 
1958, backyard furnaces began in an effort to support the government’s movement to 
gather iron and steel.  A typical backyard furnace was maintained by the villagers behind 
the local commune and was simple enough for every peasant to contribute his fair share 
to outstrip Britain.120  Steel fever spread as quotas increased and local party members felt 
pressure from the central government to produce more.  As peasants frenzied to collect 
fuel to smelt the steel, accidents became frequent; trees were crushing villagers and 
inexperienced workers slain by improvised explosives.121  The rush to meet quotas for 
steel also detracted from agricultural output, causing up to a third of the time devoted to 
agriculture to be lost.  Ultimately, much of the steel created in the backyard furnaces was 
a waste due to improper smelting techniques creating ingots, which were too small and 
brittle for the modern rolling mills.  In total, the losses from steel fever are estimated to 
be “5 billion yuan – not including damage to buildings, forest, mines and people.”122  
Another example of China’s un-productivity was the Tao River Irrigation project.  
The Tao River project was one of many irrigation projects undertaken primarily during 
the winter periods of the Great Leap Forward, many of which ended with similar 
results.123  This particular project was to divert the river “up the mountains” to provide 
clean water to villages 900 kilometers away and to transform Gansu “into a giant park as 
                                                 
118 Dikotter, Mao's Great Famine, 136.  
119 Ibid.  
120 Ibid., 58.  
121 Ibid., 59. 
122 Ibid., 61.  
123 Dongping Han, "Farmers, Mao and Discontent in China," Monthly Review (September 2009, 2009), 23.  
 35 
lush and green as the Summer Palace in Beijing.”124  As the project went on it ran into 
numerous obstacles, many stemming from poor management.  The obstacles included 
soil erosion, landslides, silt filling reservoirs, mudding rivers, the freezing cold of winter, 
and the workers’ need to forage for their own food.  Work on the project stopped by the 
summer of 1961, and then abandoned in March of 1962.  In the end, the Tao River 
irrigation project cost the state 150 million yuan, 600,000 workdays, and at least 2,400 
lives for a total of zero hectacres irrigated.125 
D. THE DEMOGRAPHIC DETOUR 
Although the Chinese government restricts the statistics and records from the 
period of 1958 to 1962 professional estimations of the Great Leap Forward all agree the 
costs have been great.  During this period, approximately “30 to 40 percent of all houses 
were turned into rubble” in the unfulfilled expectation that they would be rebuilt better 
and stronger.126  Damage to nature and its resources were countless after the polluting of 
rivers from factories and the massive cutting of forests to fuel the backyard furnaces.127  
From 1958 to 1962, an estimated “30 million births were postponed due to malnutrition 
and shortage.”128  Excess deaths due to the Great Leap Forward fall between 30 and 55 
million.129  The discontinuity in the demographic transition created by the Great Leap 
Forward then set China up for a path all its own.  
All of these costs total up to a significant demographic detour.  The difference 
between China’s demographic transition and a natural transition is most noticeable in the 
drops in the median age and life expectancy.  The median age in China dropped from 
23.8 in 1950, to 21.3 in 1960, followed by 19.7 in 1970.130  As a country progresses 
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along the demographic model, the median age should increase with a drop in death rate, it 
is the opposite case here.  The dependency ratio abruptly slowed its growth over time, 
going from 63.2 dependents per 100 potential laborers in 1950, to 72.1 in 1955, 77.3 in 
1960, 78.4 in 1965, and actually decreased to 77.3 in 1970.131   
In a more natural progression through stage 2, a country’s dependency ratio 
should have leveled off or continued to rise due to lowering death rates (increased elderly 
dependents), and begin decreasing only when birthrates begin to fall quicker than the 
death rates at the end of stage 3.  China’s change in dependency ratio, however, is from 
both a decrease in elderly as shown in the old dependency ratio,132 which showed a 
significant drop from 7.4 in 1950, to 6.6 in 1965 and from a lower number of infants.133  
The total of infants aged 0–4 in 1960 was, 96.8 million, down from 103.1 million in 1955, 
for a 6.1 percent decrease.134  
All of this is to say that the demographic result of the Great Leap Forward was a 
labor-aged population with few elderly to support, a limited number of children to focus 
upon and the ability to grow immensely in the years to come, in both economic and 
demographic terms.  Also, a flood of potential laborers were born in the years 
immediately following the Great Leap Forward,135 which meant that because of 
demography’s generational lag, twenty years down the road the labor pool would dwarf 
its elderly dependents, and allowing China to earn its first demographic dividend in an 
unprecedented manner (Figure 8).  As seen in Figure 8, there will be a massive shift in 
the in the number of potential laborers as the three largest age groups, that is 0 to 4, 5 to 
9, and 10 to14 year olds, enter the labor force.  This future labor force will also have the 
benefit of significantly smaller groups of elderly to support, because populations do not 
experience large influxes of already aged persons. 
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Figure 8.   Population Pyramid for China, 1975. (From 136) 
E. CONCLUSION 
Prior to the Great Leap Forward, China’s economic and demographic situation 
was similar to any other country as it went from a pre-transition state (stage 1) to 
experiencing accelerated growth (stage 2).  However, China’s demographic and 
economic development took a significant detour during and immediately following the 
Great Leap Forward.  This detour, caused by The Great Leap Forward created a 
governmentally caused demographic shock through inefficient and forced 
industrialization, which resulted in the death of millions, disproportionately dependents.  
This skewing of dependency ratios and the resulting baby boom to follow the Great Leap 
Forward set the stage for China to begin accelerating through its demographic transition 
and economic growth at a pace not yet experienced anywhere else.  
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IV. CASE STUDY OF CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHY AND ITS 
ECONOMIC INFLUENCES, 1970–2000 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Having examined China’s demographic and economic situation immediately 
following the Great Leap Forward, I can now move on to China’s demographic and 
economic situation just before and after instituting the One-Child Policy of 1980.  The 
year of 1980 is focused on as a turning point from the path set by the Great Leap Forward 
to that set by the One-Child Policy, which is compounded to that already set by the Great 
leap Forward. In the next chapter, I will compare the economic and demographic picture 
in China at three different times –1965, 1980, and 2000– and go on to examine the 
subsequent demographic influences on the Chinese economy from 2000–2011.   
In this chapter, I intend to demonstrate that China’s demographic detour created 
from the Great Leap Forward continued and expanded under China’s One-Child Policy.  I 
will first describe the Chinese demographic and economic situation leading to the 
institution of China’s One-Child Policy, 1970–1979, along with the government’s goals 
of the One-Child Policy, 1980.  Note that the situation in 1980 is to be primarily 
attributed to the Great Leap Forward, although the birth-limiting campaigns were also 
underway.   Next, I will cover some of the One-Child Policy’s demographic results 
followed by how some of the demographic results influenced China’s economic situation 
from 1980–2000. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, because of the skewed dependency ratio 
after The Great Leap Forward, China was staged for a pre-mature realization of the first 
demographic dividend which begins at the end of stage 3 within the demographic 
transition model.  The Post-Great Leap Forward baby boom, lasted from 1965–1980, 
creating a massive influx of potential laborers.  In 1980, the institution of the One-Child 
Policy then regulated this large labor pool’s ability to produce dependents, again creating 
a major shock to China’s already unnatural demographic development.   This shock  
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resulted in the sustainment of the first demographic dividend through governmentally 
regulated low dependency ratios, this time by limiting the youth dependency ratio, 
opposed to Great leap Forward’s skewing primarily of the elderly dependency ratio. 
B. 1970–1980: THE LEAD-UP TO THE ONE-CHILD POLICY  
Three overlapping elements led to the announcement of the One-Child Policy.  
The first element, starting in 1953, was rapid population growth peaking in a baby boom 
after the disastrous Great Leap Forward (as discussed in the previous chapter).  The 
second element was Mao’s focus on manpower as the key to modernization.137  Third, 
and ultimately, came both Deng Xiaoping’s belief that rapid population growth would 
impede modernization and his being in a position to exercise that belief.138   
From 1953 on, population growth was occurring at a rate not previously 
experienced in China.  The years 1953 to 1970, brought the annual population growth 
rate as high as 2.8 percent, a significant change from a growth rate of no more than 0.3 
percent throughout the previous century.139  This population growth illustrates China’s 
transition into the second stage of the demographic transition model, accelerated 
population increase, due to modernization and medical developments.  Throughout 
China’s history, fertility rates were relatively stable at six per woman, except for periods 
of crisis such as the Great Leap Forward, and until 1970 when it began to decrease 
naturally.140  This decrease would have been expected as seen in demographic transition 
theory, even with the detour of the Great Leap Forward, due to decreasing death rates 
which began around 1914.141 
Mao Zedong’s leadership contributed to the factors leading to the development of 
China’s One-Child Policy.  There were three “birth limitation campaigns” attempted prior 
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to the One-Child Policy.142  Mao Zedong’s firm belief in revolution and the power of 
voluntarism greatly hindered these efforts to encourage family planning.143   
The first birth limitation campaign began in August 1956, in the form of vigorous 
propaganda put forth by the Ministry of Public Health supporting mass birth control 
efforts.144  This effort lasted just over one year and had little impact on fertility when it 
was rendered ineffective by the Great Leap Forward.145  The second campaign began in 
the early 1960s and emphasized the virtues of late marriage.  By 1964, Birth control 
offices were established in the central government and some provincial level.  This 
campaign showed signs of success within the cities, “where the birth rate was cut in half 
during the 1963–66 period.”146  However, the chaos of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution brought the program and much of the progress made to an end.147   
The third campaign, pushing the mantra of “later-longer-fewer” was established 
in 1971.  The goal of this campaign was “later marriage, longer spacing between first and 
subsequent children, and fewer children.”148  While this campaign gained traction, 
through similar means as the second, it was not strictly enforced and was assessed as 
unable to achieve the desired goal for 1980; let alone the “aim of reaching a zero growth 
population by the year 2000”.149  The goal of having a sustainable population of an 
estimated 1.2 billion by the year 2000 was thought to be necessary to achieve the “Four 
Modernizations”.150  The “Four Modernizations” was the core of a development strategy  
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aimed at turning the country into a relatively advanced industrialized nation by the year 
2000. These modernizations were: agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
national defense. 
After Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping introduced a fourth birth limitation 
campaign.  This became known as the One-Child Policy on September 25, 1980, when 
China publicly announced the population control policy to the world.151  The goal of 
China’s One-Child Policy was to ensure that rapid population growth would not impede 
social and economic development.152  The One-Child Policy was unique, however, in 
that it publicly linked reproduction with economic cost or benefit.153   
The One-Child Policy, like the previous campaigns, employed a combination of 
propaganda, social pressure, and coercion. The aim of this policy was to be achieved 
through elimination of third or higher births, while incentivizing the ideal of only one 
child per couple, hoping 30 percent of couples would achieve this ideal.154  Also, the 
One-Child Policy was not meant to be a permanent fixture but a “sacrifice for one 
generation”,155 or “a crash program for 20 to 30 years.”156 
Under the one-child program, a sophisticated system rewarded those who 
observed the policy and penalized those who did not. Couples with only 
one child were given a "one-child certificate" entitling them to such 
benefits as cash bonuses, longer maternity leave, better child care, and 
preferential housing assignments. In return, they were required to pledge 
that they would not have more children. In the countryside, there was great 
pressure to adhere to the one-child limit. Because the rural population 
accounted for approximately 60 percent of the total, the effectiveness of 
the one-child policy in rural areas was considered the key to the success or 
failure of the program as a whole.  
In rural areas the day-to-day work of family planning was done by cadres 
at the team and brigade levels who were responsible for women's affairs 
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and by health workers. The women's team leader made regular household 
visits to keep track of the status of each family under her jurisdiction and 
collected information on which women were using contraceptives, the 
methods used, and which had become pregnant. She then reported to the 
brigade women's leader, who documented the information and took it to a 
monthly meeting of the commune birth-planning committee. According to 
reports, ceilings or quotas had to be adhered to; to satisfy these cutoffs, 
unmarried young people were persuaded to postpone marriage, couples 
without children were advised to "wait their turn," women with 
unauthorized pregnancies were pressured to have abortions, and those who 
already had children were urged to use contraception or undergo 
sterilization. Couples with more than one child were exhorted to be 
sterilized.157  
The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership was committed 
to developing the economy and saw controlling the population as a tool to achieve that 
end.158   As Deng Xiaoping wanted to achieve the “Four Modernizations”, he saw the 
manipulation of population growth as a means within their control.159  Due to the belief 
that population growth would impede social and economic development, the One-Child 
Policy may have been his only option to achieve the goal of a population below 1.2 
billion by the year 2000.  The most pressing factor was the fact that the Post-Great Leap 
Forward baby boomers were quickly approaching reproductive age.160  The second factor 
was a strong economic desire to save resources and increase the per capita standard of 
living.161  By limiting the population’s size, the government would be able to control 
employment levels, living standards, and education162   
C. 1980–2000: DEMOGRAPHIC RESULTS OF THE ONE-CHILD POLICY  
Intentions and realizations are often quite different, especially when discussing 
unprecedented governmental policies.  Although the One-Child Policy failed to keep 
China’s population below 1.2 billion by the year 2000, the government continued to 
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celebrate it as a success in terms of its prevention of “some 300 million births” by that 
time.163  The demographic results of the One-Child Policy include a below replacement 
fertility rate, an unnatural gender imbalance, and 20 years of an unnaturally high ratio of 
adults to youth.   
As seen in Table 1, China’s fertility rate and birth rate in 1970 were that of a 
country still in the second stage of the demographic transition model: accelerated 
population increase.  In 1970, China’s fertility rate was 5.5 births per woman over her 
lifetime, and the birth rate was 34 births per thousand in the population.164  Over the next 
ten years China’s fertility and birth rate plummeted as the government applied pressure 
on family planning programs, culminating with the One-Child Policy.  In 1980, China 
fertility rate had fallen to 2.6 births per woman, and the birth rate went down to 22 births 
per thousand.165  These trends of population control resulted in China’s fertility rate 
falling below the replacement value of 2 births per woman by 1994.  By the year of 2000, 
China’s fertility rate had fallen to 1.7 births per woman with a birth rate of 15 per 
1,000.166   
The transition stages are determined by reviewing the rates of change for the birth 
and death rates, and then context is ensured by evaluating the rate of annual population 
growth.  1970 fall under stage 3, peaked population growth, because of the large 
difference between the birth and death rates, which a 2.235 percent annual population 
growth would confirm.  1980 is considered stage 4, slowing population growth, because 
of a birth rate which is still significantly greater than the death rate but with a population 
growth rate which has decreased to 1.44.  2000 also falls under stage 4, slowing 
population growth, due to the birth rate continuing to be greater than the death rate.  Thus 
allowing for a positive, though diminishing, population growth rate of 0.597. 
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Table 1.   Chinese Demographics 1970–2000. (After 167) 
Chinese Demographics 1970–2000 





Population 814622841 981347111 20.47% 1262881912 28.69% 
Birth Rate170 31 21 -32.26% 13 -38.10% 
Fertility Rate171 4.77 2.6 -45.49% 1.7 -34.62% 
Death rate172 8 7 -12.50% 7 0.00% 
Annual Pop. Growth 2.235 1.44 -35.57% 0.597 -58.54% 
Dependency Ratio173 77 69 -10.74% 48 -30.43% 
Life expectancy174 64.57 67.67 4.80% 71.62 5.84% 
Transition Cycle Stage 3 4   4   
 
The One-Child Policy has had other consequences, in addition to the falling 
fertility rate, as a result of the incentives created by the idealized directive to have only 
one child.  China is a country which has a cultural preference for male children.  This 
preference is rooted in the desire to continue the family lineage into future 
generations;175 as well as the economic responsibilities a son has to support his parents in 
retirement, as opposed to a daughter who traditionally joins her spouse’s household for 
these regards.176   
                                                 
167 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
168 Change from 1970 to 1980. 
169 Change from 1980 to 2000. 
170 Births per thousand population. 
171 Births per woman within her lifetime. 
172 Deaths per thousand population. 
173 Number of dependents (aged 0–14 or 65+) per 100 potential laborers (aged 15–64). 
174 Age expected for a newborn baby born that year to achieve. 
175 Vermeer, Dimensions of China's Developement, 126.  
176 Shuzhuo Li et al., "Gender, Migration, and the Well-being of the Elderly in Rural China," in Aging Asia, eds. 
Kare Eggleston and Shripad Tuljapurkar (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2010), 68.  
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An imbalance of gender ratios has been found to occur naturally with 106 males 
born for every 100 females, which was the case in China as late as 1982. However, by 
1987, this ratio was 113 to 100, by 1995 it was 117 to 100, and in 2000, 120 to 100.177   
The desire for male heirs was thus expanded when the government began to support 
single-child family planning, and the development of ultra-sounds allowed for greater 
discrimination in the birthing process.178  Although the gender imbalance does not have a 
direct effect on China’s economic situation it creates a compounding influence feeding 
into the changing demographics which do influence China’s economy.  This 
compounding influence is that in each successive generation one will have fewer and 
fewer women who will each have one child.  The preference is for that child to be a male 
resulting in fewer and fewer women. 
D. 1980–2000: ECONOMIC BENEFITS DERIVED FROM CHINA’S ONE-
CHILD POLICY 
The demographic and economic situation in 1980 is a result of the Great Leap 
Forward.  This situation created by the Great Leap Forward included a massive labor 
pool, and an already decreasing dependency ratio to go with it.  This situation in 1980 
created an exceptional demographic base for the One-Child Policy to then compound 
upon.   
The economic benefits, as a product of the demographic situation rooted in the 
One-Child Policy, include an additional 20 years of a favorable dependency ratio, a 
higher level of investment in human capital, increased worker productivity, and growth in 
per capita income.  Overall, the institution of the One-Child Policy exacerbated the 
demographic detour initiated by the Great Leap Forward- it continued to extend the first 
demographic dividend, which occurs “because the productive population is growing at a 
faster rate than the total population over part of the demographic transition.”179  In 
                                                 
177 Shuzhuo Li, "Imbalanced Sex Ratio at Birth and Comprehensive Intervention in China" (Hyderabad, Xi’an 
Jiaotong University: Institute for Population and Development Studies, October 29, 2007, 2007). 
178 Vermeer, Dimensions of China's Developement, 126.  
179 Feng and Mason, The Demographic Factor in China's Transition, 14. 
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addition, the One-Child Policy laid the foundation for a future issue of a shrinking labor 
pool.   
Countries typically experience lowering fertility and birth rates, decreasing the 
dependency ratio.  The population as a whole makes calculated choices to have fewer 
children after witnessing decreased death rates and perceived advantages in reduced 
fertility.180  As the dependency ratio lowers, resources previously used for maintaining 
those dependents becomes redistributed.  In China’s case, this effect was artificially 
stimulated through governmental intervention by means of the One-Child Policy and 
occurred at an unprecedented rate.  The dependency ratio which was affected by the 
Great Leap Forward fell from 78.4 dependents to every 100 workers in 1965, to 77.3 
dependents to every 100 workers in 1970.181  Through natural means and the beginning 
of governmental emphasis on family planning the dependency ratio dropped to 60 by 
1980.  After the implementation of the One-Child Policy, the dependency ratio 
plummeted to 48 in 1985, and then to 38 by 2000 allowing the resources of an estimated 
300 million children to be redistributed throughout China’s economy.182   
The One-Child Policy “made every child precious”.183  Investment in the children 
who were born after the institution of the One-Child Policy began increasing 
substantially, particularly in terms of their education.184  For example, in 1980, there 
were 29 million children enrolled in primary school.  By 2000 that number was reduced 
to 16 million; meaning the state was not pressured to expand facilities, but was instead 
able to upgrade them while reducing class sizes and increasing teacher training.  Another 
example is that from 1980 to 2000 enrollment in lower middle school went from 15 
million to 17.6 million.  Thus showing that despite a significant reduction in the number 
of children potentially able to attend lower middle school there was actually an increase 
                                                 
180 Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory, 365.  
181 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
182 Lieberthal, The One Child Policy Turns 30, 11.  
183 Ibid.  
184 Ibid.  
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in enrollment because of the greater emphasis placed on continuing education.185  With 
the extra investment in education, the Chinese labor force became “much more skilled” 
and labor productivity rose at a much faster rate than real wages.186  Calculations of labor 
contribution as a percentage of total factor productivity within this period are as high as 
10.25 percent.187  Figure 9 illustrates the changes in output per worker from 1952 to 
2005.  The rapid growth in labor productivity circa 1991 is likely due to the entrance of 
children raised in the environment created by the “later-longer-fewer” campaign and the 
One-Child Policy into the labor market.  
 
Figure 9.   Single Factor Productivity: Output per worker and output per capital. 
(From 188) 
The One-Child Policy also laid the foundation for a potential issue to be faced at a 
later time.  Because of the estimated 300 million unborn children, a drought of new 
laborers would be felt once those unborn children would have reached the age of 
employment.189  This disappearance of new laborers would become compounded each 
year when laborers, born in the 1950–1980 baby-boom, begin leaving the labor pool.  
This difference would create a less than favorable replacement rate within the labor pool. 
                                                 
185 Ibid.  
186  Lieberthal, The One Child Policy Turns 30, 11.  
187 Selin Ozyurt, Total Factor Productivity in Chinese Industry, 1952–2005, International Association for 
Research in Income and Wealth,[2007]). 
188 Ibid. 
189 Huiting, Family Planning Law and China's Birth Control Situation, 1.  
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Economic growth in the form of China’s GDP was quite substantial from 1980 to 
2000.  As seen in Table 2, the GDP grew from $US 189 million to almost $US 1.2 
billion; a 532.77 percent increase.  This increase was a result of a multitude of factors, 
well beyond solely demographics: for example the opening up of China to the global 
market, and the many economic reforms put forth by Deng Xiaoping’s administration.  
Chinese officials say between 1982 and 2000, the “improvement” in the dependency ratio 
“has accelerated China’s economic growth by 2.3 percent per year, that is, it contributed 
to over one-quarter of China’s economic growth.”190   
High growth in per capita income within China from 1980 to 2000 was another 
benefit of the One-Child Policy, although the growth may not be as great as it first 
appears.191  During that time, China experienced a growth in per capita income of 392 
percent, from $193 to $949.   In 1980, China’s GDP per potential laborer was $623 and in 
2000, it was up to $1825, which was a 193 percent increase in per laborer income.  A 
growth in GDP per laborer of 193 percent from 1980 to 2000 is still high, but when 
compared to the more readily available benchmark of growth in GDP per capita of 392 
percent, it puts into perspective how demographic changes can affect a country’s 
economic situation. 
In this case, the skewed dependency ratio, although not the whole case, is a 
substantial part of it.  If a country’s dependency ratio becomes skewed, the per capita 
income is skewed in kind, as illustrated in Table 2.  When compared only to the number 
of potential laborers within China, those aged 15–65, the overall GDP reflects the 
population’s productivity in a more contextual sense.  For example, a person working 
from home generating $50,000 in revenue, or $50,000 per capita, looks more productive 
than a person working at home with four children generating $50,000 in revenue, or 
$10,000 per capita, although the productivity is the same.  If we used revenue per 
potential laborer, we would have $50,000 in both scenarios. 
 
                                                 
190 Vermeer, Dimensions of China's Developement, 116.  
191 Growth in GDP per capita is typically achieved through growth in total GDP (numerator), however, if the 
population (denominator) growth declines, GDP per capita will appear to have increased with or without actual growth. 
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Table 2.   1980–2000: Growth in GDP per Capita vs GDP per Pot. Laborer. (After 192) 
1980–2000: Growth in GPD per Capita vs GDP per Potential Laborer 
  1980 2000 
Percent 
Change 
GDP193 $189,399,992,474 $1,198,474,934,199 532.77% 
Total Population 981235000 1262645000 28.68% 
GDP per Capita 193 949 391.71% 
        
Dep Ratio194 69 48 -30.43% 
Percent of Pot. Laborers195 31 52 67.74% 
Pop 15–64196 304182850 656575400 115.85% 
GDP per Pot. Laborer197  623 1,825 193.16% 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
China was naturally progressing through the demographic transition model when 
it was interrupted first by the Great Leap Forward and then again, to a greater degree, by 
the One-Child Policy.  The One-Child Policy was intended to protect economic 
development from an unsustainable population.  In reality, though, the One-Child Policy 
created an economically advantageous environment for investment into human capital 
and an immense pool of potential laborers with few dependents from 1980 to 2000 at the 
earliest.  Some estimate this demographic situation has contributed up to 2.5 percent 
annual growth in GDP from the period of 1978–2000.198   
                                                 
192 Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2010. 
193 In current US$. 
194 Dependents (ages 0–14, and 65+) per 100 laborers (ages 15–64). 
195 Laborers (ages 15–64) per 100 population. 
196 Calculated by, Total Population * Percent of Pot. Laborers =Pop 15–64. 
197 Calculated by, (GDP) / (Pop 15–64) = GDP per Pot. Laborer. 
198 Vermeer, Dimensions of China's Developement, 116.  
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF CHINA’S 
DEMOGRAPHIC EVENTS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will be a comparison of China’s demographic situation in 1965, 
1980, 2000, and the economic impacts.  China was naturally progressing through the 
demographic transition model when it was interrupted first by the Great Leap Forward 
and then again, to a greater degree, by the One-Child Policy.  To best understand how the 
Great Leap Forward and the One-Child Policy’s demographic detours affected China’s 
economic situation they must be compared chronologically.  Also, the snapshots in time 
must be able to illustrate the lasting impressions of each detour.  As discussed in Chapter 
III, 1965 China will be the base year, before the full effects of the Great Leap Forward 
took effect.  1980 China will illustrate the lasting effects of the Great Leap Forward 
before the One-Child Policy.  Finally, 2000 China will show the compounding effect of 
the One-Child Policy with the detour already created by the Great Leap Forward.   
B. CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
The demographic transition sustained by China from 1965 to 2000 was “faster 
and more complete” than any similar effort.199  The transition from a country with an 
accelerating population increase (stage 2) to a country with a slowing population growth 
(stage 4), has traditionally taken an estimated three to five generations.200  China has 
completed this transition in two and a half generations; from 1980 to 2000 China reduced 
its birth rate from 36 per thousand to 13 per thousand, its death rate from 21 per thousand 
to 7 per thousand, and its population growth rate from over 1.5 percent per year to 0.6 
percent (Figure 10 and Table 3).201   
                                                 
199 Naughton, The Chinese Economy, 162.  
200 Chesnais, Demographic Transition Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure, 329.  
201 World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2010; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Population Division. 
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Figure 10.   China's Demographic Transition 1950–2005. (After 202) 
As seen in Figure 10, China’s transition was quite easily separated into the 
second, third, and fourth stages of the demographic transition cycle.  As discussed in 
Chapter II, China’s demographic transition has been underway since the early 1900s, 
beginning with the second stage, accelerated population growth.  By 1950, as illustrated 
in Figure 10, there was already a significant difference between the birth and death rates 
within China with birth rates already naturally decreasing, which may have indicated the 
beginning of the third stage of the demographic transition model, peak population 
growth.  However, this transition was interrupted in 1958 by the Great Leap Forward 
creating conditions of excess resources, no longer needing to support the 30–50 million 
dead, and a baby boom which took place immediately after.  As a result, the second stage 
of the demographic transition, accelerated population growth, was intensified and 
population growth rates exceeded 2.5 percent.   
As the baby-boom peaked between 1965 and 1970, China transitioned into the 
third stage of the transition model, peak population growth.  This stage lasted until the 
mid–1970s, when individuals began seeing benefits of smaller families, and 
governmental campaigns promoting education and access to birth control increased.  This 
choice of individuals to have smaller families and the support through governmental 
programs brought China into the fourth stage of the demographic transition, slowing 
                                                 
202 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
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population growth.  This may have allowed for China to overcome the detour created by 
the Great Leap Forward, but by the late 1970s, and officially in 1980, China’s One-Child 
Policy was announced.   
The mixture of incentives and consequences of family planning added another 
twist to the already detoured path of China’s demographic transition.  Although it took a 
few years for the One-Child Policy’s effects to be institutionalized the birth rate 
continued to plummet from the early 1980s to 2000 and beyond.  This has pushed China 
toward becoming the second country in the world to enter the fifth stage of the 
demographic transition, post-transition.  A country within the post-transition stage 
maintains a negative population growth through low birth and death rates.  This can 
create many problems which are still not yet understood and beyond the scope of this 
thesis.203  In 2012, China’s estimated population growth was down to 0.481 percent.204 
Table 3.   Chinese Demographics 1965–2000. (After 205) 
 
C. DEMOGRAPHY’S ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
The economic impacts of the demographic detour created by the Great Leap 
Forward and the One-Child Policy created lasting impressions on China.  This is most 
                                                 
203 Feng and Mason, The Demographic Factor in China's Transition.; Chesnais, Demographic Transition 
Patterns and their Impact on the Age Structure.; Kirk, Demographic Transition Theory.; Galor, The Demographic 
Transition and the Emergence of Sustained Economic Growth.; Ogawa, Changing Intergeneration Transfers in Aging 
Japan.; Mason, Demographic Dividends: The Past, the Present, and the Future. 
204 CIA, CIA World Factbook. 
205 World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2010; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 







Population 710290299 981235000 38.15% 1262645000 28.68%
Birth Rate 36 21 -41.67% 13 -38.10%
Death rate 21 7 -66.67% 7 0.00%
Annual Pop. Growth 1.521 1.44 -5.33% 0.597 -58.54%
Dependency Ratio 78 69 -11.99% 48 -30.43%
Life expectancy 59.43 67.67 13.87% 71.62 5.84%
Transition Cycle Stage 2 4 4
Chinese Demographics 1965-2000
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easily measured as illustrated in the drastic reduction in the dependency ratio, from 78 
dependents per 100 potential workers in 1965, to 69 in 1980, and 48 in 2000.  A second 
impact is the transition of the labor force being seen as tools for production to something 
worthy of investment.  A third economic impact is that some financial statistics, 
particularly that of GDP per capita, become skewed and must be interpreted more 
closely. 
One economic impact of a country’s dependency ratio is that as the dependency 
ratio lowers, the resources previously used for maintaining those dependents are 
redistributed.  Both the Great Leap Forward and the One-Child Policy skewed China’s 
dependency ratio in an economically favorable fashion.  One major difference between 
the demographic effects of the Great Leap Forward and the One-Child Policy is that the 
former affected the elderly while the latter was directed at youth.  
After the Great Leap Forward, the redirected resources totaled what supported 
tens of millions, the majority of whom were elderly, but the One-Child Policy redirected 
the resources of an estimated 300 million children between 1980 and 2000.  These 
resources, both monetary and labor, were able to be redirected into industrialization and 
modernization efforts as well as education and infrastructure.  Removing the elderly put 
those resources back into the system to be used as best fit; when removing the youth 
much of the freed resources were redirected at the remaining youth, meaning that the 
One-Child Policy “made every child precious”.206  Each experience presented different 
economic impacts.  The Great Leap Forward’s removal of the elderly created a short-term 
fix because people will continue to age, replacing this draw on resources.  Alternatively, 
the One-Child Policy presented an opportunity for long-term investment in the future 
labor force.  Estimates by Chinese officials say between 1982 and 2000, the 
“improvement” in the dependency ratio “has accelerated China’s economic growth by 2.3  
                                                 
206 Lieberthal, The One Child Policy Turns 30, 11.  
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percent per year, that is, it contributed to over one-quarter of China’s economic 
growth.”207  Of course, this estimate does not take in account the productivity lost in 
terms of unborn potential laborers.  
As seen in Figure 11, the dependency ratio changed greatly in the period from 
1950 to 2000.  Prior to the Great Leap Forward, the dependency ratio had begun to slow 
its growth, increasing by 9 dependents per worker from 1950 to 1955, and only another 5 
dependents per worker fewer by 1960.  However, by 1965, after the Great Leap Forward, 
the dependency ratio only grew by 1 dependent per hundred workers and actually began 
shrinking by 1970, returning to the 1960 level.  The skewing of the dependency ratio by 
the Great Leap Forward is illustrated in Figure 11 by the noticeable decrease in the old-
age dependency ratio, which remained below China’s 1950 level until 1975.  This 
occurred despite medical advances, the end to an extended period of conflict and an 
increased life expectancy from 44.6 years in 1950, to 66.3 years in 1975.   
 
Figure 11.   China’s Dependency Ratio, 1950–2005. (After 208) 
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The overall dependency ratio was then reduced by three coinciding factors.  The 
first factor is the natural decrease in birth rates that comes along with medical 
developments and the increased expectation of children to survive into adulthood.  The 
second factor was progress made through the third birth limiting campaign, established in 
1971, pushing the mantra of “later-longer-fewer,”209 as discussed in Chapter IV of this 
thesis. 210  The third factor was the formal institution of the One-Child Policy.  All three 
of these factors account for the reduction in the dependency ratio but this time it was 
weighted by the skewed youth dependency ratio.   
Overall, the effect of the birth limiting campaign can be seen in Figure 11 as the 
youth dependency ratio decreased by 10 youth dependents per 100 workers from 1970 to 
1980, when compared to the ten year period from 1960 to 1970 showed a decrease of 0.1 
youth dependents per 100 laborers.  In contrast, the first ten years of the One-Child 
Policy, from 1980 to 1990, experienced a decrease of 17 youth dependents per 100 
laborers, and another 5 by 2000, resulting in a youth dependency ratio of 37.7 youth per 
100 laborers and an overall dependency ratio of 48.1 dependents per laborer.211  Post-
One-Child Policy analysis of the dependency and birth rates compared to more natural 
conditions is limited due the fact that the One-Child Policy is still in place.   
As stated earlier, the economic impact of a country’s dependency ratio is that as 
the dependency ratio lowers, the resources previously used for maintaining those 
dependents becomes redistributed.  As seen in Figure 12, the labor pool grew in both 
absolute and relative terms compared to the total population creating the potential for a 
much more productive society, with or without the increased human capital seen after the 
One-Child Policy.  However, while China has sustained and benefited from a decreasing 
dependency ratio, the labor pool will soon begin to shrink due to the One-Child Policy.  
This issue is discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
                                                 
209 The goal of this campaign was; later marriage, longer spacing between first and subsequent 
children, and fewer children. 
210 Kane and Choi, China's One Child Policy, 992.  
211 The youth dependency ratio was 70.2 in 1970 and 59.8 in 1980. 
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Figure 12.   China's Labor Pool. (After 212) 
A second economic impact of China’s demographic transition is the development 
of a more skilled labor force.  Prior to and after the Great Leap Forward, China’s labor 
force was primarily unskilled and agricultural labor.  While the Great Leap Forward put 
great emphasis on and attempted to develop skilled labor the results were almost counter-
productive.  This counter-productive result is displayed in a loss of at least 5 billion 
yuan,213 and countless man-hours wasted in the backyard furnaces, as well as the famine 
which resulted from the efforts and failure to modernize the agricultural sector. 214  Also, 
by 1965, with a life expectancy of less than 60 years of age and a fertility rate just shy of 
six births per woman in her life time, the opportunity to put any significant investment 
into any particular child was not reasonable.215 
As China’s development continued, from 1965 to 1980, China rapidly exited the 
second stage of the demographic transition model, accelerated population growth, passed 
through the third stage, peak population growth, and entered the fourth stage, slowing 
population growth.  Through this period China’s life expectancy significantly increased, 
from 59 years to 68 years, and the fertility rates decreased from 5.94 births per woman in 
                                                 
212 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
213 Dikotter, Mao's Great Famine, 61.  
214 Ibid., 136.  
215 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
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her lifetime to 2.61 births.  This allowed for not only more time for a laborer to use their 
knowledge but an opportunity for increased investment into the fewer children, both by 
the state and the family, creating a pool of workers more prepared for skilled labor.   
The opportunity of investment into the youth, or future labor force, increased 
significantly with the institution of the One-Child Policy in 1980.  As discussed in 
Chapter IV, this policy is credited with the avoidance of an estimated 300 million births 
between 1980 and 2000, allowing those resources to be invested elsewhere, particularly 
for the development of those children who were born. 216  This investment is illustrated in 
the improvement in the adult literacy rate,217 from 66 percent in 1982,218 to over 90 
percent in 2000.219  These workers would be primed for skilled labor far beyond that of 
their parents, once they were ready to enter the workforce.  Calculations of labor 
contribution as a percentage of total factor productivity within this period, 1980–2000, 
are as high as 10.25 percent.220 
The third effect of China’s demographics on economics addressed here is the need 
for careful interpretation of financial statistics, particularly GDP per capita.  As seen in 
Table 4, the doubling of China’s GDP from 1965 to 1980 would normally be exceptional, 
even when you consider the GDP per capita only increased by 41 percent .  Nevertheless, 
once this growth is put into perspective by demographics, you see that the number of 
potential laborers within China grew at the same rate as the GDP.  This means the actual 
output per laborer most likely remained at the same level, or even possibly lowered.  As 
already mentioned, the skewing of the dependency ratio distorts these calculation from 
1980–2000 as well.   
                                                 
216 Huiting, Family Planning Law and China's Birth Control Situation, 1. 
217 The percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and writes a short, 
simple statement on their everyday life. 
218 Persons born prior to 1967. 
219 Persons born prior to 1985. 
220 Ozyurt, Total Factor Productivity in Chinese Industry, 1952–2005, 20. 
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However, from 1980–2000 there was still a substantial growth in worker 
productivity, approximately 190 percent growth.  The shift from stagnant productivity 
during the period following the Great Leap Forward until 1980 to growth in productivity 
from 1980 onward is a result of how the calculations were affected.   The Great Leap 
Forward’s impact was through distortion of the population, or the denominator of the 
formula, and not actual growth.  On the other hand, The later-longer-fewer birth limiting 
campaign and the One-Child Policy actually had an impact on real growth because of the 
increased investment in labor force skills, as well as the impact on the population.   
Table 4.   1965–2000: Growth in GDP per Capita vs GDP per Potential Laborer. 
(After 221) 
1965–2000: Growth in GDP per capita vs GDP per Potential Laborer 





GDP (Current US$)  $97 Bil $189 Bil 94.32% $1,198 Bil 532.77% 
Total Population 715 Mil 981 Mil 37.20% 1,263 Mil 28.68% 
GDP per Capita $136.29 $193 41.61% $949 391.71% 
  
     Dep Ratio222 78 69 -11.99% 48 -30.43% 
Percent of Pot 
Laborers223 
22% 31% 43.52% 52% 67.74% 
Pop 15–64224 154 Mil 304 Mil 96.91% 657 Mil 115.85% 
GDP per Pot Laborer225 $631 $623 -1.32% $1,825 193.16% 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
China’s demographic transition obviously had a significant impact on its 
economic development from 1965 to 2000.  The demographic factors that changed 
                                                 
221 World Bank, Gross Domestic Product 2010. 
222 Dependents (ages 0–14, and 65+) per 100 laborers (ages 15–64). 
223 Laborers (ages 15–64) per 100 population.  
224 Calculated by, Total Population * Percent of Pot. Laborers =Pop 15–64. 
225 Calculated by, (GDP) / (Pop 15–64) = GDP per Pot. Laborer. 
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include the elimination of up to tens of millions of dependents, primarily elderly, through 
the Great Leap Forward.  A baby boom experienced from the end of the Great Leap 
Forward until the late 1970s creating a very large wave of future laborers.  A 
governmentally induced transition into the fourth stage of the demographic transition 
model, slowing population growth, through the birth limiting campaigns and ultimately 
the One-Child Policy in 1980 favorably skewed the dependency ratio.  A skewed ratio 
due to the estimated 300 million births averted from 1980 to 2000.226   
The economic results of the transition include a large labor pool without the 
distraction, either financially or responsibly, of dependents.  An opportunity to invest in 
the youth, creating a generation primed to become skilled workers beyond the 
productivity of their parents.  As well as, two distinct impacts on productivity, the Great 
Leap Forward’s skewing of the GDP per capita through negatively affecting the  
population, and the One-Child Policy’s increased productivity through investment in 
human capital, as well as population controls.  
  
                                                 




In summary, China’s demographic transition had a significant impact on its 
economic development from 1965 to 2000.  A primary demographic factor that impacted 
economic development was the number of dependents, persons aged 0–14 and over 65 
years old, per hundred potential laborers, aged 15–64 years old.  The baby boom 
experienced from the end of the Great Leap Forward until the late 1970s created a very 
large wave of future labor inputs, which enabled future economic growth.  This wave of 
laborers was then exacerbated by a governmentally induced transition into the fourth 
stage of the demographic transition model, slowing population growth, through the later-
longer-fewer birth limiting campaign and ultimately the One-Child Policy in 1980.  The 
One-Child Policy, and the resulting skewed dependency ratio, due to the estimated 300 
million births averted from 1980 to 2000 created an environment that fostered increased 
investment into human capital.227  
From 1965–2000, we saw the economic results of China’s demographic transition 
included a large labor pool without the distraction, either financially or responsibly, of 
dependents.  In addition, this governmentally skewed dependency ratio created a labor 
force primed for skilled labor far beyond that of their parents, once they were ready to 
enter the workforce.  Calculations of labor contribution as a percentage of total factor 
productivity within this period are as high as 10.25 percent.228   
So far, this has all been economically positive but what happens when the 
question of sustainability arises?  Can the government continue to skew the dependency 
ratio in favor of productivity and would it be desirable for it to do so?  What happens if 
the government can no longer sustain such a favorable dependency ratio?  Can China 
survive transition into the fifth stage of the demographic transition model, post-
transition?  What will be the effects of the lost labor pool created by the OCP, 
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particularly when there will be too little replacement labor for the retiring post-GLF baby 
boom? What economic impacts will occur as a result of this labor shortage?  This cost 
can be assessed by evaluating the current demographics and where the Chinese 
demographic picture is expected to be in the next twenty years.   
B. 2010: CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHICS TODAY 
China’s demographics did not change greatly from 2000 to 2010, except for the 
continued decrease in the dependency ratio and significant increase in the country’s 
median age, both of which are results of the One-Child Policy.  China remains within the 
fourth stage of the demographic transition cycle, slowed population growth.  Currently, 
the situation continues to be economically favorable although the expectation is that the 
dependency ratio will begin to rise as the current labor force begins to retire and there are 
not enough youth to replace them.  I will address some of the future costs of China’s 
aging population, particularly when these older people have fewer children to take care of 
them, in the following section. 
As seen in Table 5, from the period of 2000 to 2010, overall population growth 
remained low and continued to decrease, reaching one half percent by 2010.  This low 
population growth resulted in a total population growth over the period of just over six 
percent, compared to an eleven percent growth in the ten years prior.  Also, the death rate 
has remained low at seven deaths per thousand in the population, a rate that is typical for 
a developed nation.229 
  
                                                 
229 Compared to the United States’ death rate of 8 and Japan of 10, and South Korea of 5. 
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Table 5.   Chinese Demographics 2000–2010. (After 230) 
Chinese Demographics 2000–2010 
  2000 2010 
Percent 
Change 
Population 1262881912 1341335000  6.21% 
Birth Rate 13 13 0.00% 
Fertility Rate 1.7 1.64 -3.53% 
Death rate 7 7 0.00% 
Annual Pop. Growth 0.597 0.5 -16.25% 
Dependency Ratio 48 38 -20.42% 
Life expectancy 71.62 73 1.93% 
Median Age  30  34.5  15.00% 
Transition Cycle Stage 4 4   
The dependency ratio continues to decrease a result of the low fertility and birth 
rates, while the One-Child Policy is assessed to have avoided an additional 100 million 
births by 2010, in addition to the 300 million between 1980 and 2000.231  China’s 
fertility rate remains low at 1.64 births per woman’s lifetime, some of which can be 
attributed to the One-Child Policy.  Although some modifications have been made to the 
One-Child Policy at the provincial level, it continues to incentivize having small families 
while administering punishments to many of the larger families.  One modification in 
2007, allows rural parents to receive annual payments at the age of 60 if they had a single 
child or two daughters, sometimes referenced as the one and a half child policy.232   The 
birth rate remained low at 13 births per thousand in the population, due to the One-Child 
Policy as well as the natural benefits which come along with the choice to have a smaller 
family.   
The median age within China has increased by almost five years within the ten 
year period of 2000–2010, to 34.5 years.  The median age is representative of the 
population’s age where fifty percent of the population is older and the other fifty percent 
                                                 
230 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
231 韩莎莎, "400 Million Births Prevented by One-Child Policy," People's Daily, October 28, 2011, 2011. 
232 Robert Benewick and Stephanie Donald, The States of China Atlas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2009), 29. 
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is younger than that age.  The rapid change of China’s median population is due to 
China’s disproportionally high number of workers and elderly, from the Post-Great Leap 
Forward baby boom, and the low proportion of children due to the One-Child Policy, 
birth limiting campaigns, and natural benefits of smaller families that modernization 
brings.  This disproportion of age groups is best illustrated through Figure 13, China’s 
population pyramid, particularly in the less than 20 year old age groups. 
 
Figure 13.   China Population Pyramid – 2010. (From 233) 
C. 2010–2030: CHINA’S DEMOGRAPHICS TOMORROW 
Predictions of what is to come in the next five years regarding political stability, 
economic growth, and regime empowerment are typically a little more than well-
educated guesses at best, but this is where demography is different.  Demographics can 
be calculated out and predicted generations ahead of time “because the overwhelming 
majority, roughly 80%, of the people who will inhabit China in 2030 are already alive, 
living there today.”234   
                                                 
233 United States Census Bureau, "International Programs - Regions Summary - U.S. Census Bureau," May 9, 
2012, http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/region.php. 
234 Eberstadt, Demographic Trends Cloud China's Long-Term Economic Outlook, 26. 
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Over the period from 2010 to 2030 China will experience at least three significant 
demographic changes.  These three changes are the transition into the fifth stage of the 
demographic transition theory, or post-transition; the reversal of an estimated fifty years 
of a declining dependency ratio; and a significant increase in the population’s age.  All of 
these changes can be attributed to, or were at least hastened by, the demographic detour 
created by the Great Leap Forward and the One-Child Policy.  One difference between 
these changes is the inevitability and magnitude of each, particularly in relation to the 
One-Child Policy.   
As seen in Table 6, by 2030 China will meet the required conditions to be in the 
fifth stage of the demographic transition model, post-transition.  These requirements are a 
diminishing birth rate equal to or below an already low death rate, resulting in a sustained 
or negative trend in population growth.  This transition to the fifth stage is expected to 
occur around 2025 when the population growth rate first becomes negative.235 
The negative growth rate is a result of the decreasing birth rate, which is 
decreasing due to the compounding effect of the One-Child Policy and China’s 
preference for male children.  The correlation of the birth rate and the number of females 
within China is obvious when the fertility rate, the number of children born per woman in 
her lifetime, has remained around 1.64 children per woman since 2005, and expected to 
remain steady.236   
Due to government intervention, sustaining the unnatural fertility rate of 1.64 
children born per woman in her lifetime, fewer females are born to later bear children 
with each generation.  While implementation of the One-Child Policy is at the provincial 
level and some modifications have occurred, such as providing bonuses and privileges to 
daughter only or one-son families in 2004, no significant changes have yet to be seen.237   
                                                 
235 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Benewick and Donald, The States of China Atlas, 29. 
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Gender birth ratios, naturally occurring at 103 to 105 boys for every 100 girls, were 
nationally as high as 123 boys for every 100 girls in 2007, driven by China’s cultural 
preference for male children.238   
If the One-Child Policy were more lenient or rescinded in the near future, the 
birth rate would likely increase and a more natural gender ratio would follow.  These two 
changes would delay transition into the posttrasition stage for an unspecified amount of 
time.  This must be done in the near future because the changes in birthing practices must 
take place before 2025 to maintain population growth.  However, such a change would 
not necessarily be as positive for the dependency ratio. 
Table 6.   Chinese Demographics 2010–2030. (After 239) 
Chinese Demographics 2010–2030 
  2010 2030 
Percent 
Change 
Population 1341335000 1432149485 6.77% 
Birth Rate240 13 9 -30.77% 
Fertility Rate241 1.64 1.64 0.00% 
Death rate242 7 10 42.86% 
Annual Pop. Growth 0.5 -0.18 -136.00% 
Dependency Ratio243 38 46 20.42% 
Life expectancy244 73 78 6.85% 
Median Age245 34.5 42.1 22.03% 
Transition Cycle Stage 4 5   
                                                 
238 Nicholas Eberstadt, "China's Future and its One-Child Policy," American Enterprise for Public Policy 
Research 30 (September 2007, 2007), 3. 
239 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs - Population Division. 
240 Births per thousand population. 
241 Births per woman in her lifetime. 
242 Deaths per thousand population. 
243 Ratio of dependents (ages 0–14 and 65+) to potential laborers (aged 15–64). 
244 Expected age for a child to attain if born that year. 
245 Age of which half of the population is older and half of the population is younger than. 
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The second significant demographic change China will experience between 2010 
and 2030 is the reversal of an estimated 50 years of a decreasing dependency ratio.  
China’s dependency ratio has been falling since the end of the Great Leap Forward. The 
dependency ratio’s peak occurred between 1960 and 1965, at around 78.4 dependents for 
every 100 potential laborers and has been decreasing ever since.  Estimates currently 
project China’s dependency ratio to begin climbing after bottoming out around 38 
dependents for every hundred potential laborers between 2015 and 2020.  The 
dependency ratio is projected to continue increasing for numerous generations afterward, 
reaching 82.3 dependents per 100 laborers in 2100.246  As seen in Figure 14, the 
dependency ratio will become slanted to the retiring and near retiring elderly population, 
those who had been born in the post-Great Leap Forward baby boom and before the 
announcement of the One-Child Policy. 
 
Figure 14.   2030 China Population Pyramid. (From 247) 
Should there be a change in the One-Child Policy, resulting in an increased birth 
rate, in the near future, much like transition to post-transition stage, projections of the 
dependency ratio would be affected greatly.  Changes in the birth rate would cause the 
                                                 
246 Ibid. 
247 United States Census Bureau, International Programs - Regions Summary - U.S. Census Bureau. 
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increase in the dependency ratio to occur at a quicker rate but potentially for a shorter 
duration.  Adding children would of course be adding dependents, for a fifteen to twenty 
year period, who would then go on to become laborers.  For that fifteen to twenty year 
period there would be an increased strain on resources but the light at the end of the 
tunnel would come more quickly once those children entered the labor force. 
The third significant demographic change is the continued aging of China’s 
population.  China’s population will continue to age at a rate of about four years every 
ten from 2010 to 2030.248  Many of the problems associated with an aging population are 
similar to and overlap with the previous two demographic changes, however the 
significance of China’s rapid aging can be illustrated in magnitude and comparison to 
other nations.  The magnitude of China’s aging is grasped in the fact that the only part of 
China’s “population that stands to increase in size between now and 2030 is the over-
fifty-year-old group,” while the sixty-five plus population will more than double in size 
from 100 million in 2005 to over 235 million in 2030.249  By comparison, China will be 
an older society than the United States by 2030 and Japan, which had reached a median 
age of 41 years old around 2000, while being “far more affluent than the most sanguine 
of optimist imagine China might be by 2030.”250 
Modification of the One-Child Policy, resulting in an increased birth rate, would 
directly affect the aging of China’s population.  Any added youth to China’s demography 
would slow the aging of the population. 
D. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
The economic implications of China’s demographic transition to the fifth stage of 
the demographic transition model are three fold.  First, there is the potential of exhausting 
the labor pool forcing wages to increase in response to the shortage in the labor supply.  
Next, the quality of labor within the labor pool will change, particularly due to the 
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decreasing number of entrants into that group.  Last, there is the question of the 
retirement system, or lack thereof, for the post-Great Leap Forward baby boomers.   
It is difficult to imagine a population of over one billion having difficulty finding 
enough people to employ, but that situation could become a reality in the near future.  
Because demographic shifts directly affect the supply of labor, predictions put the 
expected end to China’s era of a growing labor pool to land between 2013 and 2015.251  
Barry Naughton projects China’s working-age population to decrease annually by 0.1 
percent from 2015 to 2020, peaking at 0.8 percent from 2035 to 2040 and 0.6 percent 
from 2045–2050.252   
As the labor pool begins to contract, the search for employment and employees 
will become an exercise in the law of supply and demand.  This limitation on the supply 
of labor, with a constant, if not increasing, demand will increase wages raising “the 
question of whether China’s low-cost advantage may disappear and threaten its export 
competiveness”.253  This increase in wages and decrease in export competitiveness would 
then put China’s economic model in question if domestic consumption is not able to 
increase.  Domestic consumption may very well increase with the transition of laborers to 
retirees, if the retirees have accumulated enough capital; allowing China to capitalize on 
the second demographic dividend.  Nevertheless, this is unlikely due to Japan’s difficulty 
in capitalizing on this dividend, averaging annual GDP growth of just below one percent 
since 2000, 254 with a much wealthier population.255 
The next economic implication is derived from the quality of China’s labor supply 
over the next twenty years.  The quality of laborers within China greatly changed since 
the One-Child Policy with the working-age population expanding over fifty-five percent 
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from 1980 to 2005 with the education level and technical expertise increasing likewise.  
Over the next twenty years, China’s fifteen to twenty-four year old group will decrease in 
absolute size. 256  This youngest echelon of the working class is the part of the labor force 
with “the best health, the highest levels of education, the most up-to-date technical skills-
and thus the greatest potential to contribute to productivity.”257 This decrease will likely 
be felt the greatest in the need for innovation to maintain global competition, creating an 
environment that is far less than ideal “if one is aiming to maintain rapid rates of 
economic growth.”258  In particular, as diminishing returns to capital set in, the only way 
a country can continue to grow at a reasonable rate is through increases in total factor 
productivity, of which innovation is a crucial component. 
The quality of laborers will also change in the way they view family.  China is 
considered a low-trust society, with a lack in confidence in laws and official 
institutions.259  Familial ties are used to create the informal relationships required to do 
business in such a society, and China is no exception.  However, since the inception of 
the One-Child Policy, the availability of familial ties has been diminishing and will 
continue to do so as millions of families represent the 4–2–1 family concept.260  The 4–2–
1 family concept represents a family of four grandparents, two parents, and one child.  
This construct is the result of at least two generations under the One-Child Policy.  The 
persons raised within this construct have no siblings, cousins, aunts, or uncles; “their only 
blood relatives will be their ancestors,” removing the key familial element of traditional 
Chinese business.261  While the exact impact this will have on Chinese economics are 
unknown, it will force a change from how things have traditionally been done. 
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A third economic challenge brought about by China’s demographic transition is 
the question of a caring for the rapidly growing elderly population.  The magnitude of 
this requirement is shown in the projected absolute growth of the 65–plus age group 
population from the current 110 million to over 280 million by 2035.262  In dependency 
terms, this growth is from 10.7 elderly per hundred potential laborers today to 30.3 in 
2035.263  Childbirth, particularly of male children, has constituted the traditional Chinese 
retirement system.  This is still the case for the majority of China, particularly for the 
rural elderly.264  As longevity increases and China’s enters its third generation under the 
One-Child Policy, the role of caring for parents, particularly in the development of 4–2–1 
families, becomes even more burdensome as the sole provider for six ancestors.   
Recent efforts to develop a modern social security system within China have had 
many setbacks and are far from sufficient.  Barry Naughton describes China’s social 
security system as “very much a work in progress,” and it will remain as such until many 
different issues are addressed.265  Some of these issues include, incorporation into 
budgetary figures, government payments for solvency, scandals, local government efforts 
of redistribution to other funds, and inability to make timely payments to recipients.  As 
China’s transition continues, the strain on this currently under-developed system will 
only increase.  The need for this system is obvious when one considers that in two 
decades, taking in the success of the One-Child Policy, roughly a third of China’s women 
entering their sixties will have no living son and therefore no recourse to the traditional 
retirement system.266 
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, China’s demographic transition will create great difficulty in 
continuing the scale of the economic development seen over the last thirty years.  This 
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difficulty will be experienced through the costs of the demographic detour, which began 
during the Great Leap Forward and was then magnified through the birth limiting 
campaigns up to and including the One-Child Policy. While the skewing of the 
dependency ratio over the last thirty years resulted in significant contributions to China’s 
economic development, this skewing has reached a limit where the unborn laborers will 
present a strain on development.  This strain will be present in the form of a shrinking 
and rapidly aging labor pool resulting in a decrease in innovation and productivity as well 
as an overhaul to thousands of years of tradition of doing business through familial ties.  
This will all be culminated in the testing of an already failing pension system as China 
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